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Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in
Property, Liberty, and Corporate
Governance
0. Lee Reed*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, Professor Reed re-examines the importance
He continues by
of property as a formal legal institution.
arguing that central to creatingproperty is the right to exclude
others from resources acquired without force, theft, or fraud. In
countries where this right has been firmly established, per
capita income far exceeds that of countries lacking a strong
right to exclude. Professor Reed then asserts the importance to
nationbuildersof appreciatingthe virtual semantic equivalence
of the terms "property" and '"iberty." Finally, he argues that
both the specific and broad senses of corporate governance can
be reduced to property issues, making the understanding and
implementation of a strong property system an important step
towardprosperity, individual freedom, and sustainablepeace.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Without straining the biosphere or credulity, it is perfectly
possible for each person to have as a full a measure of property as Bill
Gates has,1 and having property, one also enjoys liberty, for properly
understood, the two terms are virtually synonymous. 2 Indeed, James
Madison, the fourth U.S. President and Secretary to the
Constitutional Convention, wrote an essay for the Boston Gazette in
which he asserted that Americans have a "very dear" property in
their liberty. 3 Property is the hub of Western legal systems and the
foundation of the modern private market, 4 and the problems of
corporate governance that beset not only Russia's emerging economy
but also the economies of advanced nations everywhere are little
more than enforcement challenges to an effective property system.
Nationbuilders, who would grasp the essential basis of Western
prosperity and freedom, can do no better than begin with a reductive
focus on property.
By training, scholars and practitioners who labor in the
vineyards of the common law tend to be splitters rather than
lumpers. Instead of unifying legal doctrines to promote conceptual

1.
Property is a legal right like freedom of speech rather than a collection of
things or resources; thus in the United States everyone has equal property rights just
as they have equal freedom of speech rights. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying
text.
2.
See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
3.
Quoted in JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101
(Gaillard Hunt ed. 1906).
4.
See infra note 66. See generally 0. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and
Property: A Foundation for the Private Market and Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L.J.
441 (2001).
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understanding, they divide them into exceptions and distinctions,
separating contract from property, tort from contract, criminal law
from civil law, public regulation from private law, and substance from
procedure. What is cohesive about the volumes of common-law
particularities is lost in a tangled labyrinth of cases that lawyers
have argued-and judges have decided-by distinguishing holdings
from dicta and one holding from another in ways often achieving a
triumph of result at the expense of clarity of form. 5 How confusing
this all must be when nationbuilders attempt to understand what is
important about the rule of law, and no wonder that restraint is
counseled to nationbuilders in less developed countries lest they
attempt wholesale importation of Western legal systems to secure a
6
framework for their own regulation.
At the same time there is growing apprehension that something
in the interstices of Western legal systems in both common and civil
7
law is materially responsible for the prosperity of Western nations,
which, in terms not only of general per capita income but also of per
capita income of their poor, creates wonder and envy worldwide. For
both humanitarian and practical political reasons, no more burning

5.
See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041,
1043 (1999) (observing that "legal thinkers have learned to treat standard law talk
dismissively" and that even contending parties in jurisprudential debates agree "on the
inefficiency of conventional legal reasoning"). Legal thinkers, too, sometimes muddy
the waters of understanding, often in order to promote their implicit policy goals.
Nowhere in law is this more evident than in the literature of property that seeks to
deconstruct that term's core into mere legal relations of power over limited resources,
which deconstruction can then provide a basis for democratically redistributing such
resources in a more socially equal fashion. This literature asserts that in the last
couple of centuries what it means to have property has been essentially redefined. See,

e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980). To the
contrary, the position of this essay is that the central appreciation of property has
always been that one can exclude others from limited resources. The application of
property to intangible resources, like trade secrets and good will, as well as tangible
resources, like land and the family jewels, reflects only a developing economy and the
slow accretion of case-law interpretation, rather than, according to Vandevelde, that
"the meaning of the term 'property' has changed radically." Id. at 325.

6.

See Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New

Paradigmfor Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998). Related to the cautioning
of restraint in the adopting of Western legal systems is the implication that these
systems are idiosyncratic to Western culture and values and thus may not be
appropriate for people from non-Western cultures. Id. The Author does not deny the
important role of culture in framing economic development, because culture matters
tremendously. See, e.g., CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS
(Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000). Rather, whatever the
cultural differences among countries, an effective formal property system, broadly
defined, is a material requirement for the maximum conditions of Western-style
prosperity and freedom. Worldwide, poor nations lack strong property systems and
prosperous nations have them. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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issue exists in the international community than how to help the
world's impoverished nations along a peaceful path toward
prosperity. But if this path, insofar as we best know, entails the
inculcation of Western legal concepts, then which specific concepts
need inculcating and why these particular concepts, assume great
importance. This Article argues that reductionism, the reducing of
quite complex legal doctrines and rules to an essential principle that
societies can embrace with some certainty, carries the maximum
potential for producing the greatest wealth of nations. "Property" is
that essential principle necessary for generating the likelihood for
prosperity, and this Article asserts that prosperity within the
recognized constraints of a strong property system also supports
liberty and advances the possibility for sustainable peace.
Part II begins with a discussion of the human plight of limited
resources. This is followed by a development of how Western nations
have addressed that plight and become prosperous through the
incentive of property, which is defined as a legal exclusion over
resources, a definition that is at odds with the deconstructed legal
view of property as a bundle of rights. The equal property right of
others limits an owner's use of her resources, and the resources
protected by property are traditionally subject to eminent domain and
taxation.
Acknowledging the difficulties inherent in how
nationbuilders determine who owns initial acquisitions of natural
resources like land, this Section still emphasizes that property's
success as a wealth generator depends on its strong enforcement,
broad applicability, and general stability. Part II concludes with a
story about human nature that argues why the institution of property
may naturally foster production of greater new resources than
8
systems based on compulsory sharing with strangers.
Part III maintains the close semantic connection between the
right of property and the right of liberty, a connection widely
recognized during the U.S. colonial period and embodied in the U.S.
Constitution. It continues the reductive theme by explaining that
both property and liberty are exclusionary terms applying to the
protection of one's resources, including the most basic facultative
resources of self and suggesting that property is best grasped as a
civil right like freedom of speech or religion.9
Part IV ties in the important issue of corporate governance to the
project of reductionism and maintains that the implementation and
enforcement of a strong property system is necessary both to protect
owners from managers and to secure the resources of the public and
of other members of society from the power of large business

8.
9.

See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
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organizations.1 0 At the same time, the system enables the relatively
unrestrained use of private resources, subject only to the equal
property right of others, that characterizes the framework for
Part IV also explains how
maximum new resource generation.
environmental protection, employment discrimination prohibitions,
and worker health and safety regulation fit within the property
framework.
As broad social prosperity creates perhaps the most substantial
likelihood for sustainable world peace, an understanding of the
mechanism for prosperity ought to demand the closest attention and
debate, and the Article concludes by reaffirming that the reduction of
that mechanism to the legal institution of property furthers this
debate of utmost importance. Before continuing, one caveat must be
noted: in no measure does the Article attempt to engage in
philosophizing to justify property as a right, or unequal resource
accumulation as a result. It is instead content merely to assert that
property is in fact the necessary foundation for maximum resource
production and leaving to nationbuilders the decision whether or not,
and to what extent, to institutionalize property.

II. PROPERTY AND ITS IMPORTANCE
A. Poverty, Prosperity,and Limited Resources
Poverty is widespread throughout the world. 11 Almost 250,000
12
children die weekly of poverty-related disease and malnutrition,
and the hopelessness and despair that accompany poverty is
considered a major impetus to war and terrorism. 13 At the same

10.
See infra notes 154-78 and accompanying text.
11.
According to the World Bank in 2000, 54 countries of the world had per
capita Gross National Income (hereinafter GNI) of less than $2.00 a day. WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 18-20 (2000). At least seven additional
countries where figures were unavailable likely also fell below $2.00 a day. Id.
12.
It is estimated that children suffer 30,000 such deaths every day; over
200,000 a week, or more than ten million annually, die from largely-preventable causes.
Soundbites, NEW SCIENTIST, July 27, 2002, at 8 (citing the UN Human Development
Report that "[e]very day more than 30,000 children die of preventable diseases").
13.
E.g., Allan Gerson, Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 102, 102 (2001) ("[Tjoday there is new agreement about one basic point: the
scourge of intrastate war will not be contained unless the vicious cycle of poverty,
economic injury, and political grievance is broken."); David Hendee, Expert: Hunger
Feeds Desperation, Terrorism, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 12, 2002, at B6 (quoting
Per Pinstrup-Anderson, the director-general of the International Food Policy Research
Institute that the "underlying causes of terrorism" are "poverty, hunger and
hopelessness"); Alan Wechsler, New Era, New Battles for McGovern, TIMES UNION, Oct.
8, 2002, at B4 (quoting George McGovern: "The basic cause of the spread of terrorism
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14
time, prosperity exists among a minority of the world's nations,
creating tremendous income disparity between the world's poorest
and richest, with the people of Bangladesh living on one-fifth the per
capita income of those in China, 15 who have only one forty-fifth the
per capita income of the U.S. population. 16 The discord, jealousy, and
suffering inherent where there are vast national disparities of
resources makes imperative an understanding of how such disparities
have arisen and how poverty can be ameliorated.
A variety of explanations have attempted to account for national
disparities in wealth. One that has not withstood the test of time is
the dependency theory, which holds that exploitation makes some
countries prosperous while leaving others poor. 17 Whatever the
abuses of colonialism or capitalism to indigenous populations, they do
not seem to account for why some colonial nations grew wealthy and
others did not, or why the formerly enslaved in some countries
eventually prospered while in others those who had been neither

enslaved nor colonized remained poor. 18 Nor do better educational
systems, greater natural resources, ideal population densities, or

in the world is misery and poverty and hunger."). Cf. World Bank, M2 PRESSWIRE,
July 9, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (quoting World Bank President
James D. Wolfensohn: "Only with poverty reduction will peace be possible: an unequal
planet will be a planet of war and violence. What we are discussing .. .is the basis of
peace itself.").
14.
In 2000, 19 nations had per capita GNI of $20,000 or more. WORLD
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 11.
15.
In 2000, China had $840 of GNI per capita; Bangladesh had $370. Id. at
18. Twenty-nine countries had GNI per capita lower than that of Bangladesh. Id. at
18-20.
16.
The United States had a 2000 per capita GNI of $34,100. Id. at 20. Three
countries had higher per capita GNI. Id. at 18-20.
17.
Such exploitation includes removal of resources from the developing
nations through outsider investment and trade even after the end of colonial
domination. See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. YEAGER, INSTITUTIONS, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, AND

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 13 (1999) (stating that "[iun its simplest form, dependency
theory argues that poor countries are poor because rich countries are rich").
18.
See, e.g., id. at 16-17 (summarizing four weaknesses of dependency theory,
which add up to the fact that inadequate internal economies of poor countries
contribute far more to their poverty than do trade relations with wealthier, more
developed nations). For the important effect of an internal national economy on a
people, consider the situation of African-Americans, who were enslaved in the United
States until 1863 and who continue to be discriminated against in many of the private
economic opportunities afforded by the marketplace, but who live in a relatively strong
property system, had in 1997 a per capita income of $12,351. Press Release, Number of
African Americans in Poverty Declines While Income Rises, Census Bureau Reports
(Sept. 24, 1998), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/cb98-176.html.
On
the other hand, Russians, who have been neither colonized nor enslaved (except by
communism), but who live under a weak property system, had in 2000 a per capita
GNI of $1,660. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 11, at 20.
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superior personal values materially account for why some nations
develop and grow rich and others do not. 19 Analysis suggests that
the large differences in per capita income across countries cannot be
explained by differences in access to the world's stock of productive
knowledge or to its capital markets, by differences in the ratio of
population to land or natural resources, or by differences in the quality
20
of marketable human capital or personal culture.

Mexico and the United States both enjoy fertile, mineral-rich
land masses with similar population densities, yet one is relatively
poor while the other is quite prosperous. 21 East and West Germany,
formerly politically separate but joined by common culture and highly
educated populations, nevertheless presented during their years of
separation stark contrast in per capita income, as do North and South
Korea today. 22 With the world's oldest and most populous social
culture, China possesses only a small fraction of the Gross National
23
Income (GNI) of the United States, a country scarcely 200 years old.
Defeated nations left with devastated resource bases and
infrastructures at the end of World War II now rank among the
world's wealthiest, while nations untouched by that war remain
24
mired in historic poverty.
Anthropologist Jared Diamond maintains that the broad,
relatively unobstructed land mass of Europe permitted the rapid
diffusion of new agricultural techniques from Southwest Asia, and
that abundant agricultural production accounts for the subsequent
specialization and organization of knowledge that enabled Western
25
prosperity to dominate the world technologically and militarily.
Although sufficient food does enable specialization and organization,

19.

See generally Mancur Olson, Jr., Distinguished Lecture on Economics in

Government, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1996).
20.
Id. at 19.
21.
The U.S. 2000 GNI per capita was almost seven-times that of Mexico.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 11, at 19-20.
22.
South Korea's 2000 GNI income per capita was $8,910. Id. at 19. North
Korea's was not available but could only be a small fraction of South Korea's.
23.
See supra notes 15-16.
24.
For example, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan are all among the world's
wealthiest nations in GNI per capita annual income whereas many countries of South
America and Africa were almost untouched by World War II yet still remain
impoverished. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 11, at 18-20.
25.
See generally JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF
HUMAN SOCIETIES (1999). E.g., id. at 92 (maintaining that "the availability of domestic
plants and animals ultimately explains why empires, literacy, and steel weapons
developed earliest in Eurasia and later, or not at all, on other continents"). Availability
of these items was related to the long, relatively uninterrupted, east-west axis of
Eurasia, which made the spread of agriculture go faster than elsewhere, and around
"[tihat faster spread of Eurasian agriculture ... turned the fortunes of history." Id. at
191.
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agricultural techniques and fertile land are not in themselves
materially adequate incentive to ensure maximum food development
and production. 26 They do not explain Japan's prosperous economy in
spite of its comparatively weak agriculture, 27 nor do they account for
the countries of Europe and Asia that have had agricultural
techniques and fertile lands available for centuries but nonetheless
28
remain poor.
For much of the past 50 years, the world's wealthiest countries,
primarily identified as "the West," have approached less-developed
countries as though the answer to weak economies and poverty lay in
various technical and financial aid grants. 2 9 This model for assisting
wealth production proceeds from the assumption that modern
Western economies are founded on an infrastructure of roads, dams,
and energy facilities, 30 and that grants, loans, and technical expertise
from the West to provide these advantages should catalyze lessdeveloped populations in creating sounder economies. 31 Alleviation of
sickness, hunger, and illiteracy through various forms of aid also fits
this model, and, of course, such alleviation often indicates
humanitarian impulse while at the same time fostering a healthier,
more-nourished, and better-educated human economic resource.
Unfortunately, much of this foreign aid has disappeared through
corruption or was misapplied or failed in any event to stimulate the
development of organic, prosperous economies. Even large aid
projects involving dam construction and road building create only
short-term job opportunities, and infrastructure, when completed,

26.
Professor Diamond's thesis is a powerful one, but the development of the
West into its vast position of economic superiority in the last several hundred years in
a very basic way required the recognition and institution of a strong formal property
system supported by the beliefs in the system. See generally Douglass C. North, Why
Some Countries Are Rich and Some Are Poor, 77 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 319 (2001) (stating
that property rights enforced under the rule of law and coupled with the informal
beliefs in the system is what produces the incentives that make a country rich).
27.
What explains Japan's current position of prosperity in the world is its
strong property system, which changed from a "feudal regime" at the end of World War
II. Economic Development and Integration as a Catalyst for Peace: Hearing Before the
House Int'l Relations Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Hernando de Soto),
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
28.
Consider for instance the relative poverty of Albania, Kyrgystan, and
Ukraine. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 11. China and Russia have
somewhat higher per capita GNI, but could also be placed in this group when
contrasted with the considerably more prosperous populations of much of Europe. Id.
29.
WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH 25-44 (2002)
(chronicling the direction of foreign aid for the last 50 years). See also Richard A.
Slaughter, Poor Kyrgyzstan, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 2002, LEXIS, News Group File.
30.
Slaughter, supra note 29 ("There are four principal arrows in the
['international foreign aid,] quiver: privatization, loans, direct grants and technical
assistance.").
31.
EASTERLY, supra note 29, at 29 (stating that the "idea that aid-financed
investment in dams, roads, and machines would yield growth goes back a long way").
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and technology, when introduced, often by themselves fail to give
adequate incentive for investment and risk taking necessary for
sustained new resource production and healthy economies.
Humanitarian aid is vital, but, in the absence of a growing economic
self-sufficiency, humanitarian aid is a temporary answer to world
poverty. After 50 years, aid programs have failed to reach the roots of
poverty in much of the world, 3 2 and the result is disillusionment,
discontent, despair, domestic revolution, and, recently, international
terrorism.
Privatization of economies through the marketplace has recently
been pushed as an alternative to aid programs, or at least a
supplement priming economic growth and ending the poverty of
nations. 33 This view sees state planning of resource production as
primarily responsible for stagnant, poor economies, and the lack of
general productivity in communist and socialist nations as inducing
the decline of state planning worldwide in the last years of the 20th
century. Free populations will pursue their own economic ends and
the private market will emerge, capitalism will coalesce, and a
growing prosperity will inevitably follow. In spite of the flexibility and
responsiveness of the private market in guiding resource flows,
privatization alone, or in combination even with substantial foreign
aid, does not seem adequate to create vibrant economies.3 4 Following
the collapse of the Soviet Union and privatization in substantial
sectors of the Russian economy, gross domestic product declined 40
percent in the ensuing seven years while corruption, violence, fraud,
35
and theft flourished.
In part, views concerning the causes of poverty and the
achievement of prosperity are shaped by the perception that we live

32.
EASTERLY, supra note 29, at 29 (asserting that the "aid-financed
investment fetish has led us astray for growth for fifty years"). Contra Gregg
Easterbrook, Safe Deposit, The Case for Foreign Aid, NEW REPUBLIC, July 29, 2002,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (acknowledging that although 1.2 billion
people in the world still live on a dollar or less per day in spite of the trillion dollars
spent on foreign aid since World War II, there have been some improvements in living
standards among the world's poor).
33.
The emphasis on rapid privatization is also termed "market
fundamentalism."
34.
Instead, privatization alone creates a host of corporate governance
problems. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 220 (2002)

("Privatization without necessary institutional infrastructure in the transition
countries led to asset stripping rather than wealth creation ....
By contrast,
privatization accompanied by regulation, corporate restructuring, and strong corporate
governance has led to higher growth.").
35.
According to a U.N. report, the Russian Federation's gross domestic
product (equivalent to GNI) fell by 41% between 1990 and 1997. HERNANDO DE SOTO,
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 215 (2000). As for corruption, see Michael McFaul, Russia's
Stalled Democracy, WORLD AND I, Mar. 1, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group
File (stating that "crime and corruption [in Russia] ... are still rampant").
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in a world of limited resources. 3 6 Although in some sense the
resources of the world are finite, in important ways they are infinite,
and to argue the contrary is to miss the importance of human effort
and ingenuity as the resource par excellence. For instance, land is
limited in its physical dimension, but the uses of land are virtually
without limit, and each use is a resource requiring human effort. By
itself, land produces little to sustain human wants and needs, saving
only a few fruits, nuts and berries, the occasional edible creature, and
trees for firewood and construction; but even these resources must be
picked, hunted, and chopped, and to realize them requires application
of the further resources of human effort and knowledge. Likewise, to
develop the materials under the earth requires locating, drilling,
pumping, mining, and quarrying for them to be of any use as
resources, and these steps are usually only the initial ones in creating
finished or consumable resources. At each stage, the process is
dependent on human effort and ingenuity.
The achievements of the Information Age, 37 which encompass
not only computers and the Internet, but also technological
innovations generally, including agricultural advances from the plow
to genetically modified foodstuffs, derive not from anything that is
limited, but from human effort in the organization, development, and
diffusion of knowledge resources. Resources are primarily limited in
a moment of time, not over the long span, and their existence, both at
any single moment and over time, depends on the effort and
ingenuity of people. Economies are not most productively constituted
as lifeboats requiring equitable division of ever dwindling physical
resources, but as cornucopias whose plenty is induced primarily by
the application of unlimited human resources. 38
From these

36.
E.g., Conference to Focus on Vital Forestry Issues, W. MORNING NEWS, Aug.
27, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (comment of the conference
committee chair of the National Forestry Conference urging "the construction industry
to buy British timber instead of other products which use up Earth's limited
resources"); Failure Is Not an Option, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File (stating that "the World Summit on Sustainable
Development . . . is a touchstone that indicates how serious the international
community is about reconciling its needs with the world's limited resources"); William
R. Hawkins, Outside View: Dangers of a Zero-Sum World, UPI, Sept. 3, 2002, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File (asserting that "dangerous are the implications of a
world with limited resources").
37.
Many may associate the Information Age with computers, or at least with
the development of the printing press, but the Author moves its beginnings back at
least to the development of agriculture, which led to the specialization of function,
enhancement of trade, development of writing, and, in general, to human material
progress. From this perspective, material growth is always based on the incentivebest captured in the interstices of formal property-to create and implement new
information about the world.
38.
That plenty is induced primarily by human effort is what Locke meant
when he said that of the resources "useful to the life of man.., ninety-nine hundredths
are wholly to be put on the account of labour."

JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
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simplistic, but accurate, observations derives a truism: if the social
goal is to maximize production of any given resource, society must
provide the greatest incentive to stimulating the human efforts and
ingenuity that are necessary to producing that resource. The issue
becomes to identify and institutionalize that greatest incentive.
B. Incentive and Property
The
condition
before it
economy,

way to institutionalize incentive and create the maximum
for national prosperity begins with the recognition that,
is possible to understand and predict resource flows in an
one must know how the law assigns rights within the

economy.3 9

The

legal

system,

its

implementation,

and

its

enforcement furnish the maximum incentive to human effort required
to create modern private markets, engender capital formation, and
facilitate trade, but not just any kind of legal system will prompt
economic prosperity. It must be a proper or property-based legal

system. 40 Only the strong, legal right of property creates potential for
the maximum prosperity

of nations and

materially explains to

GOVERNMENT 385, 387 (P. Laslett ed., 1967) (1690). From this view, which is the more
accurate one, Thorsten Veblen was wrong in asserting, 'The accumulation of wealth at
the upper end of the pecuniary scale implies privation at the lower end of the scale."
DINESH D'SOUzA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY 72 (2000) (quoting Veblen and
concluding, "Traditionally the debate about inequality has been conducted as if the
acquisition of wealth were a zero-sum game.").
For nationbuilders the difference between the image of resources as deriving from a
cornucopia rather than a lifeboat is vital to the understanding of property as
stimulating maximum resource potential. At the same time, the cornucopia image does
not deny that oil may be a limited resource and that the atmosphere, waterways, and
oceans cannot forever withstand the assault of unbridled pollution. It does suggest
that the solution to limited natural resources is not lifeboat equalitarian rationing but
cornucopia propertitarian effort and innovation that could, for instance, create a viable
property system out of the commons of atmosphere and water that might benefit the
people of all nations. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
39.
In other words, before economists can make predictions about a market
economy, they must know under what conditions one can own the resources
transferable in that economy. See Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of
Production,in NOBEL LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE, 1991-1995, at 11, 17 (Torsten

Perrson ed., 1997) (maintaining that "what are traded on the market are not, as is
often supposed by economists, physical entities but the rights to perform certain
actions and the rights which individuals possess [i.e., property] are established by the
legal system").
40.

Cf. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN

THE THIRD WORLD 178 (1989).
Contrary to the belief widespread in Latin America, the economic importance of
property rights is not that they provide assets which benefit their holders
exclusively, but that they give their owners sufficient incentive to add value to
their resources by investing, innovating, or pooling them productively for the
prosperity and progress of the entire community.
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nationbuilders in less-developed countries the economic success of the
West. Before examining the evidence for this assertion, it will be
necessary to establish a meaning for the term "property."
1. Property as the Right of Exclusion
Many political and legal commentators find the term "property"

almost incomprehensible. 4 1 The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
calls it "a euphonious collection of letters which serves as a general
term," 42 and a prominent legal scholar remarks that "[t]he paradigm
of a Sanskrit verb of a thousand forms could not approach in
43
diversities the phases of that concept in any single time and place."
Yet from the time of Aristotle, "property" has been associated with
Over and over
the incentive to produce new resources. 44
commentators have observed that property gives an incentive to the
inculcation of resources that other ways of approaching resource
development do not. 45 This repeated assertion suggests, for these

Id.
41.
For example, the Restatement of Property does not define a singular
meaning of the term but, rather, explains it as Hohfeldian rights, powers, and duties,
an approach difficult for law students to grasp and virtually useless to nationbuilders.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (2000). Common also to law professors, the

Restatement's approach leads nationbuilders to such unhelpful conclusions as
"[o]wnership is best described in terms of the complex relationships established by the
legal rules amongst various participants." CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
PROPERTY, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 15 (4th ed. 1997).
11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937), quoted in J.
42.
GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 68 (1998).
Compare J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 1 (1997) (stating that many

commentators consider property "a bundle of other concepts, a mere chimera of an
entity" and "a quivering, wavering, normative phantasm").
43.
Francis S. Phillbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA.
L. REV. 691, 696 (1938). See also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in
PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980)
(arguing that "property" refers to so many different rights that the term contains little
specific meaning).
Aristotle wrote, "Property should be... as a general rule, private; for when
44.
everyone has a distinct interest, men . . . will make more progress, because everyone
will be attending to his own business." Aristotle, Politics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 458 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
45.
Some select examples of this common assertion include CHANCELLOR SIR
JOHN FORTESQUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 143 (Francis Gregor trans., Robert
Clarke & Co. 1874) (circa 1464-70) (the Lord Chief Justice and Chancellor under Henry
VI asserting that because in England "every inhabitant is at his liberty fully to use and
enjoy whatever his farm produceth," including the improvements "of those he retains in
his service . . . hence it is, that the inhabitants are rich in gold, silver, and in all the
necessaries and conveniences of life"); ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS 2 (1897)
(stating that the property right "is the chief modern motive to labor, to care, and to
avoidance of waste and destruction"); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY, THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA 242 (1951) (quoting David Hume that "whatever is produced or
improved by a man's art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to
give encouragement to such useful habits and accomplishments") (emphasis omitted);
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commentators at least, some essence that flows from the
understanding of property is continuous through history and may
provide to nationbuilders a focus for construction of an economy with
the potential for maximum resource development.
That essential understanding, however, is not easily found in the
'46
usual dictionary definition of property as "things that are owned.
In fact, this definition may be responsible for much of the belief that
property has no singular meaning. 47 In Roman civil law, property
applied only to tangible things. 48 But in common law, perhaps dating

id. at 246 (quoting Jeremy Bentham "that in order to incite men to work the law ought
to secure to each man the results of his industry"); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 592 (Edwin Canan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776).
That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he
shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone sufficient to make any
country flourish .... The natural effort of every individual to better his
own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security,
is so powerful a principle that it is alone, and without any assistance
...capable of carrying on society to wealth and prosperity....
Frederic Bastiat, Property and the Law, in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY 191, 193 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000) (stating that one "will not perform
any labor if he is not sure of applying the fruit of his labors to the satisfaction of his
wants"). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to secure "to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right [i.e., property] to their respective Writings and
Discoveries" in order "[tlo promote [give incentive to] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts").
46.
Grey, supra note 43, at 69. Compare James Grunebaum, Property, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION To PHILOSOPHY 723 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995) (defining property
as "what is owned").
47.
Nationbuilders should appreciate that the meaning of property has a
common essence and not believe that the incentive property produces is based
somehow on a concept without fixed meaning; however, if they confuse property with
the things or resources to which it applies, they will have difficulty grasping its fixed
meaning. Consider when Henry Maine writes of "new forms of property" and "forms of
propriety right distinctly new." SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 244 (Dorset
Press 1986) (1861).
If he intends that property is somehow mutating from an
exclusionary right to something else, then the meaning of property itself is changing,
but if he intends only that the exclusionary right is being applied to new or different
things, the meaning of property has not changed, rather it is merely likely that as the
economy develops, disputed instances arise concerning who owns what new intangible
resource and courts are called upon to determine how property applies. In any event,
this process is gradual, operates primarily on the cusp of economic development, and
should not be taken as effecting dramatic upheaval in the general understanding of
property.
48.

PETER STEIN & JOHN SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 216

(1974) (explaining that because of the Roman view, civil law countries even today tend
"to identify ownership with the thing owned"). In spite of the civil law's orientation, all
civil law countries today recognize the right to exclude in relation to contract rights
and various forms of financial instruments, and thus they recognize property in
intangible things according to the most essential meaning of property. Even when
"property" is used to mean "things," it is not synonymous with every kind of thing but
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to the recognition of the lease right in English feudal land practices,
property also applied to intangible things. 49 It is also true that in
common and civil law new tangible and intangible things came to be
protected by property. For instance Mozart and Beethoven had no
property in the copying of their music, 50 whereas today 2 Live Crew
51
If
and the estate of Roy Orbison do have a property in theirs.
property is whatever things that are owned, and the things that are
owned are subject to change and do change, then the concept is a
shifting one from which nationbuilders can take little guidance.
On the other hand, if the emphasis of property is not on things or
resources, but on ownership, then the essential meaning of property
relates to a right rather than to things, and, if the right can be
elucidated, nationbuilders can grasp the asserted basis for why some
nations have a pronounced lead over others in resource production.
The difficulty is that much legal analysis of property ownership
regards it as a bunch of "stick-like rights" rather than as a single
right. 52
Whatever the analytical virtues of the rights-splitting

only with things that are owned, making "ownership," not "things," the semantic
essence of "property."
49.
By the reign of Edward I, the king's court had largely extended to lessees
the right of property through exclusionary in rem protection "against the world at
large." F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 36 (H.A.L. Fisher
ed., 1963) (1888). For an anthropologist's view, see Alan Macfarlane, The Mystery of
Property: Inheritance and Industrialization in England and Japan, in PROPERTY
RELATIONS, RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 104, 113 (C.M. Hann ed.,
1998) (asserting that feudal lawyers saw that the rights to a thing "were almost
infinitely expandable").
Like many others, Macfarlane equates property with a
singular thing. A better view recognizes property as a singular exclusionary right and
the resources of an object being "infinitely expandable," with each new resource
developed from other resources also being protected under the rule of accretion by the
state-instituted property right that allows owners to exclude others from that resource.
But Macfarlane is correct that feudal lawyers applied property not just to the land
itself but also to various possible uses of the land, like leasing, which the Author
regards as "resources" of the land. Remember that in this essay the point is not to
explain the perplexities of common-law or civil-law property language to nationbuilders
but to give them a basic appreciation of what it is about Western legal systems that
explains the maximum condition for resource generation.
50.
Mozart, for example, died financially strapped and in spite of his continuing
reputation had to be buried in a pauper's grave, in part because his music lacked "the
protection of any form of copyright law ..
" THE LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC
242 (Geoffrey Hindley ed., 1971). Most classical composers earned their livings
primarily by charging audiences for performances of their work and they enjoyed
patronage or both.
51.
The reference is to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(determining that the court of appeals erred in presumptively concluding that 2 Live
Crew had infringed on Roy Orbison's copyright of "Oh, Pretty Woman").
52.
Legal scholars often think of property "in terms of bundles of rights,
obligations and interpersonal relationships" that "have nothing in common except they
are exercised by persons and enforced by the State." STEIN & SHAND, supra note 48, at
216. Accord BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 4 (stating that lawyers and judges
are "near unanimous" on the bundle-of-rights concept of property). The mostly positive
rights in the bundle include the rights to possess, to use, to manage, to generate
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approach to common law legal scholarship, it is misleading to those
seeking what, in Western property law, provides the greatest
incentive to resource production. The essence of property over time
has not been that it is a bunch of stick-like, mostly positive rights but
that it is a single right: the right to exclude. 53 Property is the legal
right enforced by the state that permits the owner of a resource to
prevent others-including also in most instances the state-from
54
interfering with it.
If an owner of a resource can legally exclude others from it, the
owner can possess it, control it, consume it, destroy it, or exchange
it. 55 The single negative right of exclusion unifies the disparate
positive rights of property, which can now be thought of as ways of
using a resource-one can use it for personal possession, for
consumption, in exchange for other resources, as a gift, or to create
new or additional resources. The single negative right of exclusion

income, to consume or destroy, to alienate, and to transmit through devise and
bequeath. See A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107,
These various "rights," however, are
113 (A.G. Guest ed., First Series, 1961).
themselves resourceful uses that can be split off from a larger resource and be
protected by property, such as when a lessee possesses and can exclude others from
land for a time although the lessor retains a reversionary property in it. When
property is understood as a right rather than as the resource, one can appreciate that
the right protects not only the resource but also the subdivisions and accretions of the
resource.
PENNER, supra note 42, at 72 (stating that the "exclusion thesis is a statement
53.
of the driving analysis of property in legal systems'). See generally Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV 730 (1998). Professor Merrill develops
further the right to exclude as encompassing the essence of property in The Landscape of
ConstitutionalProperty,86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000), although he also illustrates the difficulty
of interpreting property through its exclusionary meaning as a substantive due process
right when it is not clear that the state has previously acknowledged a specific resource
(e.g., contract rights) as property. This difficulty, which relates to the fact that property
does not really apply to a resource until the court or legislature specifies that it does in spite
of the judicial propensity to "discover" rather than "apply" property in actual constitutional
cases, need not concern nationbuilders in developing countries who seek a reductionary
understanding of Western law as an engine for prosperity and liberty.
54.
The following is a more complete definition: Property is the right of persons
to exclude others, including the state, from any resource originally possessed or
acquired without force, theft, or fraud, which right is limited by the equal right of
others. Taxation and eminent domain, of course, also limit the right of property, but
they are external limitations and are not part of the definition. On the other hand,
that the right to exclude others from interfering with what one does with resources is
subject to the equal right of others (e.g., X cannot by right drive her car on Ys land
when Y may wish to exclude her from doing so) is integral to the meaning of property,
as is regulation (e.g., environmental rules) that protects the equal rights of others.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 53, at 740 (asserting
55.
that "if one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive most of the
attributes commonly associated with property through the addition of relatively minor
clarifications about the domain of the exclusive right").
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56
captures the right to exercise all of the positive uses of a resource,
and, if the state limits or prohibits some particular use of a resource,
it does not mean that no property exists in that resource or that a
new or different kind of property exists, for the property is not the
resource but the right. For example, if the state prohibits patients
who buy prescription drugs from reselling or transferring them, it
does not mean that these owners have no property in the drugs. The
right of exclusion still applies to keep others from interfering with the
owner's consumption or destruction of the drugs; the state has simply
removed the right as it would allow the owners to exclude the state
itself from interfering with the sale or other transfer of prescription
products. Likewise, in an important sense, one has property in one's
body in the right to exclude others from interfering with it, and this
ownership allows the positive sale of replaceable body parts like blood
or hair, but not of irreplaceable body organs like kidneys and corneas.
The exclusive owner, however, does control whether or not to pass
ownership of a kidney or cornea by gift. The point is not to advocate
the selling of body organs, but to explain the nature of property as the
right of exclusion, a right that does not change in meaning but only in
application when society forbids or limits a certain type of resource
development, such as marketplace trade in kidneys and corneas. 5 7
The sociologist Emile Durkheim sought a cross-cultural criterion
for the definition of property and concluded that it was the right of
exclusion: "property is the right of a given individual to exclude other
'58
individuals and collective entities from the usage of a given thing.

56.

Thus, "[t]he right to possess ... may be understood . . . simply as the right

to exclude others from the use or other benefits of the thing." LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 19 (1977); PENNER, supra note 42, at 74

(maintaining that "the owner's power to share and even transfer his property is part
and parcel of the right of exclusive use"); DE SOTO, supra note 40, at 159 (stating that
property permits owners to exclude others from interfering with the enjoyment,
disposition, and use of something). Cf. WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 157 (6th
ed. 1905). Markby asserts that,
[t]he owner of land has not one right to walk upon it, and another right to till
it; the owner of a piece of furniture has not one right to repair it, and another
right to sell it: all the various rights which an owner has over a thing are
conceived as merged in one general right of ownership.
Id.
57.

Compare

MARGARET

JANE

RADIN,

CONTESTED

COMMODITIES

(1996)

(advocating that the state not institute property in body parts), with Lori B. Andrews,
My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (1986) (urging recognition of
property in one's body). The Author does not advocate for or against property in
particular resources, but does strenuously observe that if nationbuilders wish to
increase maximally resources in quantity or amount over a broad economy, they should
institute a strong property in them.
58.

EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 142 (Cornelia

Brookfeld trans., 1957).
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Authorities from the U.S. Supreme Court 9 to William Blackstone, 60
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,61 and Thomas Hobbes 62 have asserted
that the essence of property is the right of exclusion. Even if property
also connotes things that are owned or a bundle of separable positive
rights, its essential meaning understood through Western history is
that an owner can exclude others from interfering with owned
resources. 6 3 As Professor Merrill maintains, "[g]ive someone the
right to exclude others from valued resources ... and you give them
property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have
property." 64
Thus, when commentators observe that "property"
provides maximum incentive for resource development, they may be
understood as referring to the legal right to exclude others from

59.
E.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (stating that "[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the
right to exclude others").
60.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1 (defining property as being "in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe").
61.
Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (asserting that "[p]roperty depends upon exclusion by law from
interference"). See also id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[a]n
essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it").
62.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 297 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics
1985) (1651) (stating that "[tihe Propriety [property] which a subject hath in his lands,
consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them").
63.
Important to the understanding of nationbuilders is that even though in
contemporary times the state may tax land to support public education, or that even
though in feudal times land ownership had certain duties of military service and
support attached to it, "property" has not changed its essential meaning as the right to
exclude. However, as the state increases taxation on a resource or levies heavier duties
against it, the resource shrinks and at some point the incentive to initiate further
resource development is weakened.
64.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 53, at 730. Cf. A.
JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXTS ON PROPERTY 4 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that

"[w]herever and whenever property rights have arisen, one of their central features is a
right to exclude others"). A short explanation is warranted here concerning how the
exclusionary right applies to property's familiar division into "private," "public," and
"common" usages. Private property is the exclusionary right persons have in their
resources; it represents the dominant usage of "property" and provides the primary
connotation that nationbuilders need to grasp. Public property is the exclusionary
right that the state exercises over resources, and the state certainly excludes private
citizens from many uses of the resources it holds. Common property as it refers to
resources like the atmosphere or oceans is largely a misnomer due to the fact that one
cannot usually exclude others from using these resources; more accurately, the
reference is to common "resources," thus avoiding the confusion of property with
resources. However, as suggested infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text, if the
state were to recognize everyone's right to exclude others from polluting common
resources, it would be appropriate to term this right as "property," even as co-owners of
land have the right to exclude each other from wasting its resources.
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interfering with one's resources, a right that was protected and
65
enforced through the early common-law action for trespass.
2. The Incentive of Property and the Evidence Linking Property and
Prosperity
The law of property is the deep foundation of the modern private
market.6 6 The right of exclusion gives incentive to exchanges in the
creation, production, and distribution of resources to such a degree
that without it, private trade is reduced to face-to-face barter or trade
with trusted friends and relatives. 6 7 Without knowing who owns
what, moving resources by exchange from those who have them to
those who want and need them the most becomes excessively costly.
In his Nobel Laureate address, economist Ronald Coase asserted that
the legal system "has a profound effect on the working of the
economic system and may in certain respects be said to control it." 68
Not any kind of legal system, however, engenders the greatest
resource production but only "an appropriate system of property
69
rights" does.
If no legal ownership exists, people constantly have to guard the
resources they control from strangers, and, in such an instance, the
weaker always have resources subject to the predations of the more
powerful. 70 Without the right of property, no laws against theft and
robbery protect one's possession of resources. No tort laws provide
compensation for wrongful injury to one's resources. No laws of

65.
Trespass is the "fertile mother of actions." F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 48 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1963) (1909). It is
the basis of modern tort law. William J. Bowman & Patrick F. Hofer, The Fallacy of
PersonalInjury Liability Coverage for Environmental Claims, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 393,
411 (1993) ("[T]o examine the history of trespass is to explore the history of all torts, for
it evolved into the forms of redress for all civil wrongs ....
Trespass to land was but
one of these wrongs."). Trespass recognizes a sphere of private resources related not
only to land and other non-facultative resources but also to the faculties and body of an
owner who can exclude others from interfering with (trespassing on) this sphere.
66.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 8 (1933) (stating that "[p]rivate enterprise, which has molded
economic life since the close of the middle ages, has been rooted in the institution of
private property"); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 128 (1995) (describing property as an "indispensable" institution "for
creating a modern market-oriented economic system"); Greenspan Speech, infra note
162 and accompanying text (describing property as an "essential infrastructure of a
market economy"). See generally Reed, supra note 4.
67.
In other words, "without the right institutional environment [i.e., property
and contract], a country will be restricted to trades that are self enforcing." MANCUR
OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY 185 (2000).
68.
Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL
LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE, 1991-1995 11, 17 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997).
69.
Id.
70.
This includes the power of the state, which is always greater than the
power of the individual.
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contract ensure that executory agreements for the transfer of
resources one controls can be enforced. In the absence of the property
right, both the raising of capital for resource development and the
private division and subdivision of resources become extremely
difficult. 7 1 It is no exaggeration to state, along with economist
Hernando de Soto, that "[tihe hidden architecture of sustainable
development is the law [of propertyl. 72 The incentive that the law of
property stimulates has enabled Western prosperity in resourceful
productions ranging from agriculture to silicon chips.
The empirical evidence connecting the institution of property to
national prosperity begins with the recognition that the Western
states and a few Pacific Rim countries have both the world's highest
per capita incomes and the world's strongest exclusionary property
systems. 73 Although the connection could be coincidental, no feasible
alternative explanation for such linkage exists except than that
strong property law gives maximum incentive for the activities that
create new resources which lead to high per capita incomes.
Conversely, it is likely that the world's least prosperous nations
remain so because they lack adequate property law and its requisite
enforcement.
A 2002 study of "economic freedom," which is
acknowledged to be "an evaluation of property rights, broadly
conceived, '74 concluded that nations with "very high protection" of
property average $23,769 per capita in 1999 purchasing power
parity. 75 Nations with "high protection" of property average $13,027
per capita; "moderate protection" nations average $4,963; "low
protection" nations average $3,010; and "very low protection" nations
average $2,651.76 A study of property-strong versus property-weak
countries from 1975 to 1995 found that countries that strengthened
the property right the most during that period registered a 2.7%
annual Gross National Product (GNP) growth, whereas those nations
where the property right weakened most significantly averaged 0.6%

71.
Reed, supra note 4, at 451-52 (discussing how property creates security for
capital borrowing and investment, provides incentive to improve resources, and
identifies and protects resources that can then be used for further resource
development). See generally DE SOTO, supra note 35.
72.
Making Sustainable Development Work, FDCH Fed. Dept. & Agency Docs.,
July 12, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (quoted by Sec'y of State Colin
Powell).
73.
The converse is also true: countries with no formal property systems are
the poorest in the world. The empirical studies that justify these statements are found
infra notes 74-78.
74.

(2002)
75.
76.

GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL, JR. ET AL., 2002 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 37

Id. at 40.
Id.
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annual GNP declines. 77 An analysis in 1989 of all studies then
available concluded that strong-property nations grew at three times
the annual rate and were two and one-half times more efficient than
78
weak-property nations.
In explaining why "capitalism triumphs in the West and fails
everywhere else," 79 de Soto asserted that the signal difference,
especially in the inventions and applications of technology, between
the highly-developed and prosperous Western countries and the lessprosperous and less-developed remainder of the world, is that the
Western countries have possessed relatively strong property systems
for at least 200 to 300 years longer than the rest of the world.80 Even
if the nations of the world started several hundred years ago at
income parity, the property-weak countries would fall behind quickly
if the property-strong countries grew only at a rate of two percent
greater per year. Allowing for disruptions of war and the changing of
regimes, one can still see that compounding a two-percent annual
advantage in resource production over 200 years could easily account
for the ten-fold income disparity that exists today between many
81
property-strong and property-weak countries.
Consider that the income disparity also translates to disparity in
technology attainment, infrastructure development and food, housing,
education, and health resource availability, all of which provide a
basis not only for a prosperous life but for even greater resource
development. For nationbuilders the lesson seems clear: institute a
strong property in any resource to give incentive to its maximum
production; to lower production of a resource, reduce the incentive to
develop by weakening or eliminating the property right in it through
taxation or prohibition. The lack of resources called "poverty" is the
disease for which an adequate property system is the long-term cure.

77.

JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995

(1996).
78.

Gerald W. Sully, The Institutional Framework and Economic Development,

96 J. POL. ECON. 952 (1989).

79.
The quoted phrase is the subtitle of DE SOTO, supra note 35.
80.
Id. at 177 (asserting that the "importance of property rights has been
emphasized by various economic historians who believe that the boom in technological
innovation in the West, and the massive investment that made it possible, began only
at the end of the eighteenth century, when property rights were perfected and made
independent of politics"). Thus, for at least two hundred years, property has been "the
most important legal conception" in Western culture. TONY HONORE, MAKING LAW
BIND 161 (1987). Yet unfortunately "today, few are aware of the tremendous edge that
formal property systems have given Western societies." DE SOTO, supra note 35, at
224-25.
81.
The figures cited supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text are the basis for
this approximate figure.
The per capita income differences between the very
wealthiest, strong-property nations and the very poorest, weak-property nations can
vary from 10- to 100-fold. Cf. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 11. At an
annually compounded two-percent increase, a nation's economy will double every 34.5
years, or increase 64-fold in 206 years.
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C. Other Property Issues
Several other issues key to nationbuilders' understanding of
property deserve brief treatment. Each issue warrants volumes of
discussion, but, in the spirit of reductionism, the treatment here
simply places the issue in the context of the exclusionary right.
1. Property and Resource Acquisition
In strong-property nations, how resources are acquired
determines whether or not the state recognizes them as property. To
be considered subject to the right of property, resources cannot be
acquired by coercion, theft, or fraud.8 2 The law recognizes a variety of
ways to legally acquire resources in a property system, including
exchange, gift, accession, confusion, and first possession, but robbers,
thieves, and defrauders do not own what they acquire and cannot
take the resources of others without suffering the likelihood of
criminal and civil consequences intended to protect lawfully
83
recognized owners.
Although the institution of a property system is of vital
importance in nationbuilding, how resources are acquired in the first
instance can be problematic during the creation of the system. In
some countries lacking effective property systems, a relatively few
individuals or families have come to control much of the land and its
resources. What happens to these vast holdings as nations institute
effective property systems is not certain nor automatic. Whether
these holdings are formalized and protected by the property right or
whether some type of redistributive land reform takes place before
formalization occurs, economic disruption is likely to result.8 4 It is in

82.

Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 370 (Donald

Winch ed., Penguin Classics 1988) (1848) ("According to the fundamental idea of
property, indeed, nothing ought to be treated as such, which has been acquired by force
or fraud, or appropriation in ignorance of a prior title vested in some other
person .. "). That one cannot acquire resources "dishonestly" and then have them
protected by the property right is part of ensuring this right in others. Cf. MARKBY,
supra note 56. ("It [that one is 'the absolute and exclusive owner'] does not mean that
he may exercise his ownership in accordance with his uncontrolled fancy ....
I cannot
exercise my rights in such a way to infringe the law or the rights of others.").
83.
Because property organizes social order in relation to the distribution and
production of resources, it necessarily is sensitive to the community's interest that one
not become an owner through coercion, theft, or fraud (technically, fraud creates
voidable ownership) and thus violate the equal property right of others. Criminal and
tort law are spokes radiating from the central conceptual hub of property in Western
legal systems, spokes that generally serve to enforce the equal property right of others
or else compensate for its infringement.
84.
Note that the initial assignment of the property right to X or Y is not
dictated by some inevitable arrangement, and the argument can be made that vast
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the amelioration of this disruption in a country that the international
community can appropriately assist with various forms of aid, but
such assistance should always be linked to the strengthening and
stability of a broad-based property system if the goal is to maximize
the future potential for resource development and production.
When governments rather than powerful families control the
resources of a country, a property system can be instituted through
sale of the resources, a lottery distribution, a free distribution to all
citizens, or some type of claiming system such as homesteading. In
the United States, the surveying and distribution of public lands
through sale helped hundreds of thousands of citizens to acquire
millions of acres of land,8 5 which have remained within the property
system. On the other hand, the Dawes Act, 86 which failed to give
Native Americans adequate property in certain reservation lands,
thwarted existing tribal property systems, and created a federal trust
on remaining lands that has seriously failed its purpose,8 7 hardly
provides a model for implementing an effective property system.
One suggestion for nationbuilders attempting to place resource
acquisition and development under a property system is to build the
system from the bottom up rather than the top down. In so doing,
primary concern should be focused on ensuring that the vast majority
of the people have their resources protected by property. 88 As has
been observed, one of the greatest virtues of an equally implemented
exclusionary right is that it benefits the poor as much as the

resource holdings acquired outside of a formal property system are not protected from
redistribution, but once the assignment is recognized within a formal property system
that protects the equal exclusionary right of all persons, reassignment will be strongly
resisted and if it occurs may produce substantial weakening of incentive because of the
uncertainty felt concerning the further reallocation of resources. Facing uncertainty
about where the right of property lies-or is likely to lie in the future-people will tend
to keep their assets concealable and easily movable. They will also be unlikely to risk
them in fixed locations in ways productive of additional resource growth.
85.
The basic act was the Homestead Act. 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64, repealed by
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, tit. 7, § 702, 90 Stat. 2744, 2787.
General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current
86.
version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 334-358 (2002)).
87.
See generally Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property and
the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001).
88.
In other words, the state should focus on the broad enforcement of the
property right, such that common citizens feel secure in their persons and possessions
and have recourse for resource infringement and injury. However, when the focus is on
privatizing large industrial and mining enterprises, getting ownership adequately into
the hands of outsiders who can prevent insider corruption and looting can be difficult.
See generally ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: Is THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? (1994) (chronicling the experiences of a
Polish economist and lawyer in helping privatize state enterprises through a voucher
system). On Russia's attempts to privatize industry, which has led to a corporate
governance crisis in ownership, see Fox & Heller, infra note 157.
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wealthy,8 9 who, unlike the poor, can more easily protect their
resources by force. Building a property system from the bottom up
also recognizes that freeing the poor from unnecessary regulatory
shackles, which may keep them from exercising the resource they
acquire by original possession, is important to unleashing the
incentive of property.
The studies of de Soto indicate that one way to formalize
property in less-developed countries from the bottom up is to allow
people to acquire land ownership through local consensus. 90 Land is
a basic building block in a private market economy; yet, without
formal property recognition, one's land cannot be resourcefullyleveraged or capitalized because few lenders are likely to extend
affordable credit secured by the land unless the borrower is an owner
formally recognized by the state.9 1 De Soto recommends that local
consensus works effectively in establishing the boundaries for formal
property recognition. 92 That local consensus exists suggests that in
many parts of the world a de facto property right is already present
whose prosperity-creating incentive can then be unleashed through a
state-recognized de jure right.

89.

E.g., TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY

THROUGH THE AGES 202 (1998) (observing that "if property laws are applied equally
they will work above all to the advantage of the poor"). Thus, the United States may
still have poor individuals, but it hardly has the level of poverty that exists in most
areas of the world.
90.
Local consensus does not mean informal ownership; rather, it refers to how
formal ownership protected by the state should be determined-namely, by local
agreement that is then recognized by the state. It is a way of "adapting the law to the
social and economic needs of the majority of the population." DE SOTO, supra note 35,
at 106. In this way law is "made to serve popular capital formation and economic
growth." Id. Another example of a bottom-up, property-based approach to economic
development involves the micro-lending activities of the Grameen Bank, which
provides unsecured business loans to the poor in the developing world. See generally
MUHAMEED YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR, MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST
WORLD POVERTY (1999).
91.
DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 60 ("Without the tools of formal property, it is
hard to see how assets could be used for everything they accomplish in the West. How
else could financial organizations identify trustworthy borrowers on a massive scale?").
92.
De Soto is referring to property determination by local consensus when he
describes informal resource boundaries as marked by barking dogs. Id. at 162. De
Soto argues,
Any government that is serious about reengineering the ruling informal
agreements into one national formal property social contract needs to listen to
its barking dogs. To integrate all forms of property into a unified system,
governments must find out how and why local conventions work and how
strong they actually are.
Id.
He continues, "What governments in developing countries have to do is listen to the
barking dogs in their own communities and find out what their law should say." Id. at
168.
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2. Property and the Equal Rights of Others
Property is an exclusionary right that, under the rule of law,
applies equally to the resource acquisitions and aggregations of the
wealthy and the poor alike. As a right, property is like a blanket that
covers everyone, allowing each person to acquire, create, and use
resources in ways that produce the greatest potential for resource
maximization. Property, however, does permit some persons to
accumulate resources that others do not have: because by definition
"resources" are what others may need or want, there is some
justification for the familiar argument that if X has something in
limited quantity that others need or want, X has a type of power over
them because she can bend them to her will so they can get what they
need from her. 93 Of course they have a similar "power" over her in a
property system due to the resources they own, but because property
permits unequal accumulations of resources, X may have greater
"power" than they have. They may need what she has more than she
needs what they have. Still, in the sense that property is a blanket,
everyone enjoys an equal right to exclude, and thus Bill Gates in his
resources has no more or less property than others in their resources.
Importantly, the equal exclusionary right that each person
enjoys means that an owner's use of resources has ascertainable

93.

JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM 260 (1990) (asserting that "the myth of property is pernicious

because it hides a structure of power and insulates it from democratic debate"); Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (stating that if "somebody
else wants to use the food, the house, the land, or the plow which the law calls mine, he
has to get my consent. To the extent that these things are necessary to the life of my
neighbor, the law thus confers on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I
want."); Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary
Significance, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 3, 5 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1980) (stating that "ownership of Wildfell Hall [Blackacrel, it often seems, is a form
of power that allows us to exploit other people").
The focus on property as power has a strong Marxian flavor. Sheldon S. Wolin, On
Reading Marx Politically,in MARXISM: NoMos XXVI 79, 89 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1983) (noting the "persistence with which he [Marx] judged each
theory according to the standard of power"). Ultimately, power is not an analytically
useful concept in contrasting property versus re-distributionist resource systems. In
any society whoever controls vast resources has "power" in the sense of the citations of
note 93, and this especially includes the state, which has power over both those from
whom it takes resources and those to whom resources are redistributed and who must
obey the state in order to obtain further resources. In fact, in a strong property society
there will be more needed resources available privately to everybody than in a redistributionist society, and this in a real sense reduces the power that the state is
capable of exercising over one. Because people on average tend to be much more
prosperous in a strong property society that has many sources for inexpensive
resources available, wealthy individuals also generally do not have undue power over
others on account of unequal resources. For instance, 99.9% of the population in the
United States can publically proclaim "fie on you Bill Gates" without concern that the
world's richest man can exercise any power at all over them.
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limits. 94 Although Blackstone asserted that property was a right of
"absolute dominion," he also recognized that an owner's "free use,
enjoyment, and disposal" of resources was subject to "the laws of the
land. '95 In Entick v. Carrington, Lord Chancellor Pratt wrote that
the right of property "is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all
instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some
public law for the good of the whole. '96 These statements may be
taken to recognize the legitimacy of taxation of and eminent domain
over one's resources, 97 but they also acknowledge that one owner
cannot use resources in certain ways so as to interfere with another
owner's use of resources. 98
Property has no purpose outside of
community, meaning that Robinson Crusoe had no need to worry
about whether the fruit he picked or the animals he trapped belonged
to someone else. The implication of this is that the very concept of
property contains limitation on resource use: in a strong property
system, one's exclusionary right is always limited by the equal right
of others to their resources.
Thus, property can be seen as the hub of Western legal systems
with the law of contract and the law of tort as spokes radiating from
the hub and establishing limitations protecting the equal property
right of others. Contract law sets forth equally enforceable conditions
concerning consequences of the breach of an agreement to transfer
resources. 99 Tort law and much of criminal law protect resources and

94.
Further, these limits are part of the definition of property. If the rich can
use their resources to injure or coerce the resources of the poor, it indicates a weak
property system, usually one lacking an adequate enforcement of the property right.
E.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogues on PrivateProperty, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 362 (1954)
("[1]f any property owner could really do anything he pleased with his own property,
the rights of all of his neighbors would be undermined.... In fact, private property as
we know it is always subject to limitations based on the rights of other individuals in
the universe.").
95.

2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, at *138.

96.
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howells St. Trials 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807,
843 (1765).
97.
Taxation is necessary even under the strongest of property systems for
public goods like roads and military defenses. Resource exchanges among individuals
do not generate public goods well because of excessive transaction costs, "free riders,"
and "last-holder" problems. Adequate humanitarian assistance also requires taxation.
98.
It is vital to emphasize to nationbuilders that perhaps the most important
and least recognized features of a strong property system is that it respects the equal
property right of others. Without such respect, engendered by the state through
impartial, timely enforcement of the exclusive rights of all citizens, property cannot
create the kind of prosperity and liberty that exists in Western nations. See Robert C.
Cooter, Organization as Property: Economic Analysis of Property Law Applied to
Privatization,J. LEGAL ECON., Dec. 1992, at 77, 78.
99.
Without contract the promise to transfer resources in the future would be
meaningless, and Professor Nichols identifies the recognition of contract law as the
most salient characteristic of an economy that is ready for international trade. Philip
M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 294-95
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establish limits on what one can do with resources that are consonant
with the equal limitations placed on others, and these laws provide
various compensatory and punitive measures for one's violation of
these limitations.10 0 Under this analysis, most all other areas of the
law can also be reduced to spokes connected to the hub of property.10 '
3. Property Enforcement
The
concept
of property
also
includes
its
adequate
enforcement.1 0 2 Without the enforcement necessary to implement a
property system, a state will not be creating conditions conducive to
maximum prosperity. 10 3 In much of Western political theory, the
ultimate justification of the state is to legalize civilly and formally the
right of property. 10 4 But to stimulate the incentive that induces the

(1999). Underlying contract, however, must be the fact that the contracting parties
have the legal right to exclude others from the resources which are the object of the
contract. That legal right is property.
100.
Note that to achieve desirable reductionism, no distinction is made here
between legal wrongs to one's person and legal wrongs to one's land or widgets, nor to
civil or criminal responses to these wrongs. In all instances one has the right to
exclude others from interfering with one's resources broadly defined; i.e., one has
property.
101.
For example, much public law regulation concerning safety, health, and
compensation exists to keep X and her use of resources from unduly interfering with
the right of others to their resources under circumstances where the private
enforcement of tort or contract law would engender excessive transaction costs or
would be otherwise infeasible.
102.
Thus, "there is a consensus that property cannot exist without some
institutional structure that stands ready to support it." Merrill, Propertyand the Right
to Exclude, supra note 53, at 733. Blackstone agrees. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
supra note 60, at *141 ("Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man's
life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and
the law be duly administered therein.").
103.
The concept of "maximum prosperity" can be extended to include not only
the generation of resources that are typically generated in the marketplace but also the
maximum encouragement of the facultative resources of the self, the condition
traditionally associated with "liberty."
104. For example, in the U.S. experience consider James Madison's assertion
about the broad sense of property, "Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals as that which the
term particularly expresses." MADISON, supra note 3, at 102. Compare the views of
Gouverneur Morris, "It was only for the sake of property that men gave up the greater
freedom of the state of nature and submitted themselves to the constraints of society
and government." Quoted in NEDELSKY, supra note 93, at 68. Nor should these views
be considered held only by Locke and his adherents, but rather, in Samuel Adams'
words, property is "an essential, unalterable right in nature, engrafted into the British
constitution as a fundamental law, and ever held sacred and irrevocable by the subjects
within the realm .. " Quoted in ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1776-91, at 254 (1991). Also, it is not only the broad sense of property as
applied to life and liberty that makes it central to the civil state. As John Davies, the
British Attorney General of Ireland in the early 1600s, maintained, 'The first and
principal cause of making kings was to maintain property and contracts, and traffic
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greatest wealth of nations, the state must also enforce contracts and
ensure that corruption, fraud, theft, and coercion not make owners
spend their efforts, ingenuity, time, and money defending valuable
resources instead of freely using these resources to create, produce,
and exchange new resources. Honest police, ethical lawyers, and
impartial judges or other dispute resolvers are necessary to
accomplish enforcement, and nationbuilders cannot claim to have
implemented a strong property system without such enforcement.1 0 5
Prompt foreign assistance targeted at eliminating corruption and
focusing on law enforcement might have prevented the economic
debacle following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Rapid but
incomplete market privatization coupled with scanty and ambiguous
property law in the absence of adequate law enforcement materially
caused the Russian economy to decline following the Soviet Union's
demise. 10 6 On the other hand, in China, the move from almost total
state planning to partial property and contract recognition,
accompanied by the training of new judges and lawyers has provided
10 7
the conditions for much new economic growth in that country.
D. Property and the Story of Evolved Human Behavior
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were largely Lockean in
their view that ownership was something "natural" to human
beings, 0 8 which was associated with the belief that God had given
people dominion over nature and over themselves.' 0 9 This dominion
is represented by the concept of "property," which means in this

and commerce among men." Quoted in JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 33 (1986).
105.
The formal rules of a property system are easily asserted by the state. The
difficulty lies in the system's fair enforcement, and for this reason nationbuilders need
to educate the social importance of the property system at all levels of society. Cf. DE
SOTO, supra note 35, at 223 (urging that "we must make represented systems like
property] simpler and more transparent and work hard to make people understand
them").
106.
See infra note 160 and accompanying text. See also DE SOTO, supra note
35, at 215 (citing that the gross domestic product of Russia declined 41% from 1990 to
1997).
107.
See, e.g., Testimony of Minxin Pei before the House InternationalRelations
Committee, FDCH Congressional Testimony, 105th Cong. (1998), LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File (stating that the development of the legal system "has
become one of the most important institutional changes in China since the late 1970s").
Unfortunately, China's property system is still quite weak and corruption in both the
political and economic spheres is prevalent.
See generally JULIA KWONG, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA (1997).

108.

See, e.g., Statement of Samuel Adams in RUTLAND, supra note 104, at 254.

109.

See id.
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usage, as in other historical usages, the right to exclude others. 110
Although the application of property to various resources has differed
through history, the view that property is a natural right, the
protection of which civil government was established, continues to
this very day and is often viewed as a moral right. 1" Around the time
of the American Revolution, it was even called a "sacred" right, 1 12 and
the colonies invoked their natural authority in contending that the
113
British had no right to tax them without representation.
Other thinkers and political theorists have argued that although
property in no way has the imprimatur of divine providence, it is still
the basis for the civil state, and its justification is the "common
good." 114 Thus, utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham termed property
"the noblest triumph,"115 and both natural law and utilitarian
theorists have recognized the incentive engendered by the
exclusionary right as fostering social prosperity. Whether "property"
itself is a natural or purely civil institution, there seems to be
something in its legal recognition that people respond to with greater
resource production than when resources are state-managed or
communal.
Nationbuilders from other cultures may reject notions that the
efficacy of a property system is based on God's ordinance and may

110.
In other words, whatever the historical usage of the term "property," at
some level that usage meant one could exclude others-including the state-from a
resource, and only inasmuch as one could legally exclude others do we have the
essential meaning of property. That over the centuries new resources (e.g., trade
secrets and business goodwill) came to be protected by property does not reflect change
in the term's core meaning, only the specific resources to which property applies have
changed.
111.
For the proposition that property is a moral right, see generally ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF
LIBERTY (1982). Note that this Article is not asserting property as a moral right. It
merely argues to nationbuilders that a strong property system produces the maximum
potential for national prosperity and personal liberty.
112.
E.g., Statement of Samuel Adams in RUTLAND, supra note 104, at 254.
Only a few years later, Alexander Hamilton maintained that "a principle cause of the
Union" was to protect "the sacred rights of private property." Quoted in Stuart
Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System
of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1142. Accord Carol M. Rose,
Property and Expropriation:Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 1 (stating that "no taxation without representation" is "fundamentally about
taking property without consent").
113.
REID, supra note 104, at 40 (asserting that property encompassed "the
entire American constitutional case against parliamentary taxation"); Carol M. Rose,
Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 1 (stating that "no taxation without representation" is "fundamentally about
taking property without consent"); SCHLATTER, supra note 45, at 188 ("Behind the
slogan, 'no taxation without representation,' stood the Lockean theory of property.").
114.
See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmentation,32 ENVTL.
REP. 11321 (2002).
115.
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in PROPERTY, MAINSTREAM
AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 39, 53 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Basil Blackwell 1978) (1692).
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disagree with the ambiguous concept of the "common good." Why,
then, does there seem to be such a profound relation between a right
to exclude others from infringing on the results of our resourceful
efforts and the greatest wealth of nations? Economists argue that
individuals act rationally in their "self-interest,"1' 16 but that is not an
explanation of why the right of property engenders such resource
production. It is only a description of behavior.
An explanation, however, exists that, while controversial, fits
much of an important new understanding of human behavior:
evolutionary psychology.
Although this explanation of evolved
behavior is unnecessary to appreciating the fact that the exclusionary
right in fact seems to engender the condition for maximum resource
production, it does tell a story that helps illuminate what it means to
say that we act out of self-interest, 1 17 and it suggests why it is
difficult to educate or otherwise persuade people voluntarily to share
substantial resources according to the needs of strangers. The story
begins with the assertion that basic human behaviors are evolved
characteristics, much like an upright posture or the possession of
language capacity are evolved characteristics, and that these
behaviors have been selected because our ancestors who practiced
l 8
them were more successful in surviving, mating, and passing on 1
the genes that emphasized such behaviors in the first instance.1 19

116.
This view is basic to Adam Smith, who saw the competitive self-interests of
sellers in the marketplace as an "invisible hand" guiding the best goods at the lowest
prices to buyers.
117.
The Author calls what follows a "story" because there is no current way to
prove it through scientific experiment. Nonetheless, the "story" is consistent with the
evidence we do know.
118.
E.g., David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences:
Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1989)
(asserting that "[ilndividuals lacking favored [mating] characteristics tend to become
no one's ancestors"); Hudson Kern Reeve, Acting for the Good of Others: Kinship and
Reciprocity with Some New Twists, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 43,
44 (Charles Crawford & Dennis Krebs eds., 1998)
The evolutionary perspective is as follows: An organism that helps another will
likely incur some reproductive cost, such as a loss of resources to allocate to its
own offspring (at least temporarily), increased mortality risk, or reduction in
other components of Darwinian fitness (i.e., reproductive success). This means
that any gene that increases the probability of helping behavior will reduce its
frequency in future generations and, ultimately, will be lost unless there is
some compensating reproductive benefit ... [e.g., benefit to relatives].
Id.
Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 17 (1998) ('Where resources are scarce,

disinterested generosity is not a viable strategy for survival ....
[T]he pure altruist
keeps a smaller and smaller share of the world's stock, until the retained share is
insufficient to allow for survival or reproduction of its own kind.").
119.
Textbooks asserting that basic human behaviors reflect evolutionary
development include: DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE
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Those who did not practice such behaviors are not our ancestors-in

general

they were less successful

in mating, and over many

generations their genes died out.

Although evolutionary psychology has difficulty relating evolved
human behavior as an explanation for highly specific human actions,
such :as driving on the right or left side of the highway, the human
concern with resource acquisition, the reluctance to surrender large
portions of what one has acquired simply to meet the needs of
strangers, and the initiative-dampening effect of coercing acquired
resources from people through taxation or otherwise are very general,
not specific, behavioral tendencies. 120 They seem related to the fact
that human children mature very slowly and require inordinate
resource investment, in contrast to the young of other species, and
that parental caregivers, as a part of the procreation of their genes,
cannot afford to surrender too many limited resources to strangers
121
that their offspring may need, else the offspring may not survive.
Females as the primary caregivers tend to look carefully before
mating with males who are both able and willing to help provide
resources to raise offspring, 12 2 whereas males tend to be assertive in

OF THE MIND (1999); JOHN CARTWRIGHT, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2000);
STEVEN J.C. GAULIN & DONALD H. MCBURNEY, PSYCHOLOGY, AN EVOLUTIONARY
APPROACH (2001). The hypothesis is that our basic human behaviors today reflect
what served us well in small group hunter-gatherer living. E.g., GAULIN & MCBURNEY,
supra, at 90 ('To put it plainly, our psychological adaptations are those of Pleistocene
hunter-gatherers."). The use of evolutionary psychology to illuminate problems of law
and jurisprudence has already begun. See, e.g., JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY
JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM
THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989); MARGARET GRUDER, LAW AND THE MIND:
BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991); Owen D. Jones, Law and
Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
265 (1994). The Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law holds regular academic
See
conferences and maintains a website with a source bibliography.
http://www.sealsite.org.
120.
The point is that these general behaviors are basic to individual survival
and procreation and that when suppressed they negatively affect the direction of
additional resource-generating effort.
The death of offspring is by far the most significant limitation on passing
121.
one's genes to the future, the death of related kin being the other limitation. The
concept of the "selfish gene" that influences human behavior to perpetuate its future
provides the principal basis for evolutionary psychology. An extensive discussion is
found in CARTWRIGHT, supra note 118, at 57-90. Note that the influence of the genes
on behavior suggests no genetic "intent," only that over thousands of generations,
genes that emphasize successful survival, mating, and child-rearing have tended to
flourish while genes that run counter to such successful practices have tended to
vanish from the genome. During the vast span of time, the acquisition, possession, and
control of needed resources by both genders have been determinative of successful
human survival and procreation.
E.g., BUSS, supra note 118, at 104 ('The evolution of the female preference
122.
for males offering resources may be the most ancient and pervasive basis for female
choice in the animal kingdom."). Buss applies this conclusion to humans based on his
study of over 10,000 individuals in 37 cultures. Id. at 108-09.
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acquiring and displaying resources in order to convince females of
123
their mating worthiness.
This story about human behavior is made more complex in that
human resource behaviors evolved during the 98 or 99 percent of our
existence as a species that was spent in small bands of huntergatherers whose "economies" resembled that of the lifeboat rather
than the cornucopia. 124 Members of these bands shared extensively
with each other, 125 but the bands were quite small and the members

DAVID P. BARISH & JUDITH EVE LIPTON, THE MYTH OF MONOGAMY:
123.
FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY IN ANIMALS AND PEOPLE 132 (2001) ("Men... accumulate
property [resources]-as well as prestige and power of other sorts-so as to attract
women."); e.g., DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE 47 (1994) ('Men strive to
control resources and exclude other men from resources to fulfill women's mating
preferences. In human evolutionary history, men who fail to accumulate resources
failed to attract mates."). Resources are thus vital to both genders, not only for selfsurvival but for the mating process that leads to procreation and passes the genes from
one generation to the next. Cf. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 71 (1999)
(maintaining that "the leading causes of human acquisitiveness [are] the need of
territory and of objects with which to sustain oneself and to procreate").
124.
PIPES, supra note 123, at 86. Larger forms of human social organization
such as the tribe, city-state, and nation did not begin to coalesce until the advent of
agriculture approximately 10,000 years ago. Nigel Nicholson, Evolutionary Psychology,
Toward a New View of Human Nature, 50 HUM. REL. 1053, 1060 (1997). The
territories that hunter-gatherers controlled were like lifeboats in the sense of having
limited, non-agricultural, food resources, and the various bands were likely zealous in
The
protecting "their" territorial resources from the predations of strangers.
implication is that during virtually all of human development, strong behaviors of
acquiring and defending resources made one more likely to pass genes to subsequent
generations, behaviors that are still with us. Sharing behavior is perhaps also part of
our behavioral heritage, but its beneficiaries are usually our immediate associates,
especially our relatives, and extensive sharing is not common with strangers, even our
fellow countrymen. Compassionate sharing should certainly be encouraged and taught
both through the educational system and moral exhortation, but it is likely that only
coercion could induce people to part with even half of their disposable incomes to
alleviate the suffering of the 30,000 children worldwide who die daily from largely
preventable disease and hunger. See supra note 12. Those individuals who act with
continuous compassion throughout their lives to relieve the suffering of general
humanity are usually rare enough to be accorded sainthood. Cf. EDWARD 0. WILSON,
CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 277 (1998) (stating that "true compassion is
a commodity in chronically short supply").
125.
The considerable extent of sharing in small-group societies is frequently
discussed in PROPERTY RELATIONS, RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION (C.
M. Hann ed., 1998). Professor Epstein believes that self-interested resource behavior
can lead to cooperation and reciprocal sharing. EPSTEIN, supra note 119, at 18.
[The] theory of individual self-interest is not only a theory of conflict and
competition; it is one of cooperation as well. The organism that goes it alone
has no allies to fall back upon when things go bad, and is blocked from
engaging in any projects that require the coordination of two or more actors.
The logic of self-interest does not, cannot, ignore the gains from cooperation in
order to maximize only those gains from competition and aggression.
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were considerably interrelated. In sharing with others, they were
helping to perpetuate their own genes, 126 held also by their relatives,
and, in any event, they were avoiding conflict with people on whom
they depended for cooperative enterprises like hunting and fighting.
But their sharing behavior did not extend to potentially large and
needy groups of strangers; our distant ancestors may have shared
with the occasional stranger, but, if they shared too many of their
lifeboat resources with strangers, they did not have enough for
themselves and their offspring.
Those with the inclination for
excessive sharing were gradually eliminated from the gene pool,
victims in hard times of their own generosity and, in a sense, of the
more selfish, hoarding tendencies of others.
In contemporary society, the behaviors that evolved and
supported small hunter-gatherer bands in lifeboat economies still
prevail in modern humans. 127 The concern about acquiring more
resources, the social status and attractiveness for mating of those
who have large resource holdings, and the reluctance to share a very
significant portion of personal resources with strangers are all still
deeply embedded in human behavior. 128 Perhaps, most significantly,

Id. The theory of individual self-interest is similar to--although not exactly the same
as-the story about why sexual selection pressures have evolved behavior that make it
difficult for humans to share a significantly large percentage of their resources with
strangers.
126.
The primary cite for kinship effects on social behavior like sharing is W. D.
Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 THEORETIcAL BEHAV. 1 (1964).
See generally supra note 118.
127.
Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 119, at 17.
Only the most naive form of human exceptionalism could lead us to believe that
[evolutionary] forces that operate on all living creatures, from single-cell
organisms to primates, cease as if by magic to exert their influence on human
beings. Traits that natural selection has molded for eons do not disappear
without a trace....
Id. Further, humans tend not to be conscious of how their behavior is shaped by the
adaptation of their genes to evolutionary forces. Douglas A. Terry, Don't Forget About
Reciprocal Altruism: Critical Review of the Evolutionary JurisprudenceMovement, 34
CONN. L. REV. 477, 479 (2002). Thus, that we are not consciously aware, for instance,
of how we have been shaped to work harder for ourselves and our families than for
others makes it even more difficult for us to suppress this evolutionary propensity and
to share according to the needs of the larger society because it seems to go against the
very nature of ourselves.
128.
Of course, that individual behavior is natural does not mean that society
should encourage it, and there may be behaviors that are "deeply embedded" in human
nature which we do not wish to encourage, such as the violent expression of anger and
jealousy. If acquisitiveness (or possessiveness) is such a behavior, why not just teach
people to suppress it like we teach them to suppress the expression of anger and
jealousy? The problem is that in suppressing acquisitiveness connected to resource
development and production (which is most acquisitiveness not connected with robbery
and theft) we reduce the incentive to develop and produce in the first instance, a side
effect not present when we teach people to manage their socially negative emotions.
Suppressing acquisitiveness also does not encourage additional voluntary sharing with
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foreknowledge of the coerced taking of the resources one produces
still depresses human initiative to maximize resourceful effort
because the resources so produced are not perceived to benefit the
Individuals do not
individual nor her family or relatives. 129
appreciate consciously how deeply inclined they are toward these selfinterested and offspring-interested behaviors, but inclined they are.
The point of this story is that "property" is the legal institution
that best accommodates hunter-gatherer resource behaviors in
modern mega-societies of strangers. "Property" also gives maximum
incentive to resourceful productions because this right allows
individuals to exclude others from what they acquire so that they can
direct it toward their own survival, mating, and the survival of their
offspring and relatives. Because people in strong property states live
not in lifeboat economies but in cornucopia economies that allow them
to produce far more than they or their families can consume, they
specialize and trade for mutual advantage in what becomes the
modern market. As the supplies of resources increase, competition
arises, and the prices of resources decrease. People can acquire more
while spending less and prosperity flowers, 130 a prosperity, however,
that depends on the incentives of a legal exclusionary right that
allows people to determine what happens to the resources for which
they have worked or risked.
The story of evolved resource behavior contains no moral
justification for selfishness, legal recognition of gender differences, or
oppression of strangers or the poor. It merely emphasizes that
educating, cajoling, and coercing people to produce according to their
abilities and to share according to the needs of strangers cannot
economies.
resource-maximizing
for
potential
the
create
Nationbuilders may preach compassionate sharing and study creative
ways of taxing cornucopia resources so as to minimize the perception
of resource coercion, but they must also enforce a strong property
system that accommodates rather intractable human behavior in
order to grow the greatest wealth of nations. Thus, the case for

strangers; more likely, it lessens sharing as the incentive for acquiring new resources is
reduced.
This point is critical to the understanding of why, if a nation wishes to
129.
produce more of a resource, it should establish a property in the resource. The reason
is that through exchange, greater production of resources makes for a more prosperous
society as additional goods (and services) become available and competition lowers
prices.
A market for the efficient exchange of resources will emerge organically
130.
from a strong property system, although the reverse is not true, indicating that
property is fundamental for a prosperity-maximizing private market. See Greenspan
Speech, infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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not seventeenth-century

III. LIBERTY

One commentator worries that the West has forgotten the
connection between property and prosperity. 13 2 Numerous recent
references urging nationbuilders to frame their economies with a
strong property system suggest that the memory was not forgotten
but merely repressed, and that once again it is emerging into
consciousness.' 3 3
On the other hand, the connection between
property and liberty is still deeply buried for most, but in the spirit of
reductionism, this memory, too, needs refreshing. Nationbuilders
should want to know of the similarity of these concepts in history so
they can help construct free and peaceful as well as prosperous
societies.
Although the Greeks and other ancients may have enjoyed
considerable freedoms, they lacked the grasp of a term equivalent to
"liberty.'1 34 In Western history one of its earlier accounts of libertydefined roughly as the right to be left alone by the state if one is not
engaging in behavior that harms others-appears in the
enumerations of the Charter of Liberties, better known as the Magna

131.
BETHELL, supra note 89, at 8. Cf. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 315 (Martin E. Marty ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1902)
(asserting that "the instinct of ownership is fundamental in man's nature"). In
pursuing the aim of a reductionary effort of moderate length, I will not attempt here to
answer all of the objections that may be raised to this story of human nature and its
implications for the legal institution of property. Suffice it to say that the Author
believes the story holds as true for a shareholder's ownership of a few shares of stock in
Nike as for her ownership of her toothbrush or her personal photographs.
132.
DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 8 (asserting "that Westerners take this
mechanism [property] so completely for granted that they have lost all awareness of its
existence"). De Soto expresses concern that "there always remains the possibility that
the West might damage the source of its own strength" by forgetting the necessary
legal basis for its prosperity. Id.
133.
For a series of cites to this effect quoting or referencing presidents, foreign
ministers, treasury secretaries, the G-7 finance ministers, the Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund, the Secretary General of the United Nations, numerous
journalists, and others, see Reed, supra note 4, at nn.1-10 and accompanying text. A
slightly optimistic fact suggesting that property systems worldwide are strengthening
is that the proportion of those living in global poverty dropped from 29% to 23% during
the 1990s. Statistical Snapshot of a World Divided by Poverty, IRISH TIMES, July 24,
2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (citing the U.N. Report on Human
Development).
134.
ISIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xli (1969) (noting that whereas the
Greeks may have enjoyed "a great measure of what we should today call individual
liberty, . . . that the notion had not explicitly emerged, and was therefore not central to
Greek culture").
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Carta, or Great Charter. 135 Central to the Charter of Liberties and
the next 800 years of constitutional liberty in England and its
colonies is the 1215 version of due process: "No freeman shall be
arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold, or in any
way molested; and we [the King, the State] will not set forth against
him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his
peers."'136 Note that the liberty an owner has from being arbitrarily
deprived of a right to land is given equal significance with the liberty
not to be arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned.
By 1225, the Charter of Liberties had added to its enumerations
a provision that foreshadows modern protections against
uncompensated takings: "No Sheriff or Baliff of ours, or any other,
shall take the horses or carts of any man to make carriage, except he
pay the old price limited, that is to say, for carriage with two horse
x.d. a day; for three horse xiv.d. a day."'1 37 To secure the citizenry

against arbitrary state takings by requiring compensation deserves
the name "liberty" just as to free people to use their resources by
allowing them legally to exclude others from interfering with these
resources warrants the name "property." Both terms express the
right of exclusion against the state, and although liberty today
generally refers to the right of private persons to exclude the state
from interfering with resourceful faculties such as speech and
freedom of movement and property is usually used in reference to
exclusive non-facultative resources, the two are virtual synonyms in
their exclusionary connotation. Further, if the resources of the self,
including speech, movement, and free direction of effort and
ingenuity, are considered the basis of non-facultative resource
creation, then the liberty right to direct the resources of self and the
property right to direct non-facultative resources become inextricably

135.

One of the better accounts of property's relation to the Charter of Liberties is

BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS, FROM MAGNA

CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (2001). Although the discussion that follows in this essay centers on the
common-law tradition, note that in the civil law tradition, property and liberty were also
spoken of in the same terms. For instance, the Austrian Civil Code stated that "property is
the liberty to do with the substances and uses of a thing according to one's wants and
desires and to exclude every other person therefrom." Quoted in RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY
AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 105 (1914);
FREDERIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 109-110 (Seymour Cain

trans., Foundation for Economic Education 1964) (a French political economist maintaining
in 1848 that "[p]roperty, the right to enjoy the fruits of one's labor, the right to work, to
exercise one's faculties, according to one's own understanding, without the state intervening
otherwise than by its protective action-this is what is meant by liberty'); Jean Baechler,
Liberty, Property, and Equality (John W. Chapman trans.), in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII,
supra note 93, at 269, 287 (a French political theorist maintaining that "[l]iberty and
property form an indissoluable unity in society and politics').
Quoted in SIEGAN, supra note 135, at 7.
136.
137.
Id. at 11.
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related. What must be remembered is that outside of the economic
lifeboat, where the main issue is resource division, people generate
additional, prosperity-engendering resources through their efforts,
and although raw materials are important to resource generation,
they do not by themselves often represent consumable, useful
resources.
They become consumable or useful only after the
application of human faculties, the liberty and property of which give
greatest incentive to resourceful production.
That liberty and property are interconnected is suggested not
only by the Charter of Liberties, but also throughout English
constitutionalism. Five hundred years after the Charter of Liberties,
Blackstone in his famous Commentaries on the common law
' 138
identified three "absolute" rights "inherent in every Englishman.
They were: (1) "personal security," or "a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health
and his reputation; ' 1 39 (2) "personal liberty," or "the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one's person to whatsoever
place one's inclination may direct; without imprisonment or
restraint; ' 140 and (3) "property. ' 14 1 The resemblance of these rights
to the familiar triune "life, liberty, and property" is a strong one, but
Blackstone adds that these rights are usually summed up in one
general application and denominated "the natural liberty of
mankind. ' 142 That property is a subset of natural liberty is
unmistakably asserted.
Not long after Blackstone wrote, James Madison turned around
this assertion and maintained that liberty is a form of property.
Acknowledging that in its "particular application," property refers to
the dominion that one "claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in exclusion of every other individual,' 143 Madison also
argued that "[iln its larger and juster meaning" property includes
one's "opinions and the free communication of them," the "profession
and practice" of one's religion, the "free use" of one's "faculties and
free choice of the objects on which to employ them," and "the safety
and liberty" of one's person. 144 Defining property as Madison does, as
a right "in exclusion of every other individual,' 1 45 leaves little
semantic difference between property and liberty.
Legal historian John Phillip Reid has made the broad claim that
"[t]here may have been no eighteenth-century educated American

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, at
Id. at *129.
Id. at *134.
Id. at *138.
Id. at *125 (emphasis added).

143.

MADISON, supra note 3.

144.
145.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

*138.
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146
who did not associate defense of liberty with defense of property."'
Professor Reid also states that "[t]oday we think of their emphasis
upon property as a defense of the material and tend to forget how
much the concept of liberty in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries depended upon property. . . . [It is sometimes forgotten
that liberty itself was spoken of and thought of as a property. '147 As a
colonial American wrote in 1768, "[1]iberty and [piroperty are not only
join'd in common discourse, but are in their own natures so nearly
148
ally'd, that we cannot be said to possess the one without the other."'
149
Securing "the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"'
was, after all, primarily about ensuring that the state would not be
able to take without consent or compensation what belonged to the
citizens, including their facultative freedoms, and, along with
Madison, they believed that even as one "is said to have a right to his
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights."150
Both the genesis of the American Revolution and of the Constitution
lie in that which is similar in both liberty and property.
Conceptually, the near indistinguishability of the rights of
liberty and property is found in the works of John Locke and
repeatedly in his Second Treatise on Government, which may have
had greater philosophical impact on the American Revolution than

146.

REID, supra note 104, at 33.

147.
JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 27 (1987). Another view connecting liberty and

property, which is examined at length in GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY &
PROPRIETY (1997), maintains that property is necessary to liberty because it enables
individuals to hold resources apart from state control and thus be independent of the
state, a condition that facilitates "liberty." In a somewhat different vein, Professor
Reid is suggesting that many colonists regarded liberty and property as semantically
co-extensive so that one could say that she had a property in resources or a liberty in
resources rather interchangeably. The Author's reductionary assertion concurs with
the latter view, recognizing that although liberty and property have been often used as
different terms, even in colonial times, they have a deep identity in their exclusionary
nature, and the distinction between the facultative resources of the person and the
non-facultative resources developed or acquired through the productions of the
facultative resources is not significant when attempting to explain Western freedom
and prosperity to nationbuilders. Cf. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CAPITALISM 21-22 (1939) (asserting that "the meaning of property" is "the liberty of
expected activity in acquiring, using and disposing of things" and stating that property
and liberty are united "in an identical concept"); John 0. McGinnis, The Once and
Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 63 (1996)
(quoting Trenchard and Gordon from Cato's Letters, one of the most popular and
respected sources of ideas during the colonial era: "By Liberty, I understand the Power
which every Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruits of his
Labour, Art, and Industry ... ").
148.
Quoted in REID, supra note 104, at 33.
149.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
150.

MADISON, supra note 3.
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any other political work.151 Locke asserts that one has a property in
the facultative rights to oneself.152 This concept of self ownership
equates property and liberty, for both terms refer to one's right to
exclude the state and others from facultative and non-facultative

resources alike.

Currently, it may be fashionable to separate the concepts of
liberty and property, but the entire legal basis for colonial America's
argument against the British state was that the most basic
exclusionary principle of English constitutionalism and common law
was being taken from the colonists by taxation without due process
representation. 15 3 The Lord Mayor of London acknowledged that "if

we can tax the Americans without their consent [i.e., their
representation in Parliament], they have no property, nothing they
can call their own, 1 54 and this deprivation was the taking of liberty
itself. For nationbuilders who wish to grasp what about the
underpinnings of prosperity and freedom in the United States is most
essential, the key is to appreciate the interconnected meaning of

151.
Behind some of the most important issues of the Revolution, like taxation
without representation, "stood the Lockean theory of property." SCHLA1TER, supra
note 45, at 188. The Second Treatise contained Locke's most developed thoughts on
property. It is also undeniable that Blackstone and his Commentaries played an
important role in the legal and philosophical education of those who dominated the
Revolutionary Era, but Blackstone, too, was influenced by Locke. GOrrFRIED DIETZE,
IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 27 (1963) (stating that Locke's ideas "were assumed by the
outstanding commentator on English law, Blackstone").
152.
For example, Locke asserted that one was "a proprietor of his own person."
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hacket
1980) (1690).
Before Locke, Hobbes asserted self-ownership in similar fashion.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 382 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1651)
("Of things held in Propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life ..
"). In
the United States, Madison wrote that one has a "property in the free use of his
faculties." MADISON, supra note 3. Jefferson approvingly translated a French thinker
with an almost identical view. COUNT DESTUTT TRACY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL
ECONOMY 53 (Thomas Jefferson trans., Augustus M. Kelly 1970) (1817) (maintaining
that persons "have each one the inalienable, incommutable, and inevitable property, in
their individuality and its faculties ... ").
Owning oneself and having the free use of one's faculties is, for practical purposes,
difficult to distinguish from liberty, and "it is sometimes said that the idea of selfownership stands at the heart of all liberalism." JONATHAN WOLFE, ROBERT NOZICK:
PROPERTY, JUSTICE AND THE MINIMAL STATE 8 (1991). However, the Author's view of
property should not be taken merely as embracing "the natural-rights individualist
theory" of liberalism. Id. at 4. My view of self-ownership is based on the difficulty of
distinguishing property and liberty given that it is in large measure the exercise of
one's facultative resources that develops and produces non-facultative resources so that
the latter become extensions of one's self and one's faculties in a very real way. The
distinction between property and liberty blurs because it is the free expression of one's
faculties-not just the presence of raw materials-that produces new resources.
153.
It was not that the colonists objected to the idea of taxation, only that it
took place without their consent, which is a due process concept dating back to the
Charter of Liberties. See SIEGAN, supra note 135.
154.
Quoted in REID, supra note 104, at 45.
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liberty and property as the general right to exclude the state and
others from the broadest range of resources, with self-ownership as
the generative basis for maximum production of new and additional
resources.
That not everyone was free to enjoy the right of exclusion is not
an indictment of the importance of liberty and property in colonial
America or 16th and 17th century Great Britain. That women had no
right to vote and had a more limited property right than men and
that Africans were enslaved in the New World and had the selfownership right enjoyed by others stripped from them does not
contradict the premise that the exclusionary right is the hallmark
both of freedom and prosperity.
It does show the horrendous
consequences of failing to extend equal liberty and property to all
persons within the jurisdiction of the state, however, and it illustrates
that the ideals of liberty and property fall short of perfect
accomplishment in even the freest and most prosperous nations.
The lesson for nationbuilders is that it is not enough to proclaim
the words "liberty" and "property," but that the exclusionary right
underlying these terms must be equally and generally applied under
the rule of law, and that the resources to which it applies must be
recognized in the widest terms. Further, the more resources to which
liberty/property applies, the stronger the system and the freer and
more prosperous the citizenry. The caveat is always that, although it
may be easy to say the words "liberty" and "property," it can be
difficult to enforce them in practice with regard to the equal
exclusionary right of others. 155
The final Part considers how those who run giant businesses can
ignore the equal exclusionary right of others. The issues of corporate
governance are pressing, and they illustrate well the difficulties of
implementing the enforcement of a strong system of liberty/property
("property") in order to create freedom, prosperity, and peace.

IV.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Specifically, corporate governance refers to the legal relationship
among the owners of a business organization and between them and

155.
This difficulty covers everything from the democratic propensity to vote
ourselves the resources owned by others (through taxation or otherwise) to slavery and
the legal oppression of women. Probably, the most thoughtful consideration of this
problem in the era of the Constitution's framing comes from Madison's famous tenth
Federalist essay. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the managerial agents who run it.1 5 6 In a broader sense, corporate
governance relates to the general limits that society places on
economic actors, the very biggest of which are transnational
corporations. Whether in its specific or broad sense, the issues of
corporate governance can be reduced to the exclusionary right as it is
limited by the equal right of others. The operation of a strong
property system does not free economic actors to do anything they
wish, but rather it protects the resources of the weaker against the
predations of the more powerful. It secures the equal right of all.
A. The Specific Sense of Corporate Governance and Property
Some of the very worst abuses of corporate governance in the
specific sense can today be found in Russia where "strong man"
domination of the formerly communist manufacturing sector of the
economy prevails. Former Soviet managers often continue to control
companies with little nod to their new outside owners; accounting
procedures are weak and firm decision-making lacks minimal
transparency; and extremely low market values of company stocks
reflect investor conviction that corruption, mismanagement, fraud,
and theft are the norm. 157 Merrit Fox and Michael Heller assert that
many Russian managers "refuse to register share purchases by
outsiders, refuse to recognize board directors properly elected by
outside shareholders, dilute stock in ways that freeze out outsiders by
issuing shares to insiders for inadequate consideration, or engage in
false bankruptcies that wipe out shareholders' interests. 1 58 One
manager installed guards to keep shareholders out of a gypsum plant
and ignored dozens of court decisions against him over several
159
years.
This list of corporate governance horrors can be reduced to the
egregious failure to institute, implement, and enforce a strong
property system. For a private market to function, the state must
enable business owners to exclude others from interfering with
business resources, and "others" certainly include the fiduciary
agents employed by the owners. In part, the sad lack of corporate
governance in Russia is attributable to International Monetary Fund
(IMF) economists who encouraged Russia in the months following the

156.
STIGLITZ, supra note 34, at 264 & n.1 (2002) (defining "corporate
governance" as "the laws that determine the rights of shareholders, including minority
shareholders").
See generally Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance
157.
Lessons from Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720 (2000). These
problems are extreme examples of problems common to large, private business entities
worldwide where owners hold passive interests controlled by managers (agents). See
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 324 (1993).
Fox & Heller, supra note 157, at 1741.
158.
159.
Id. at 1742.
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Soviet Union's collapse toward market fundamentalism, 160 the belief
that privatization itself can alleviate the inadequacies of state
planning and set a developing country on the road to economic
growth. A more measured, bottom-up approach like China is taking,
which allows the development of smaller private companies within a
growing commercial law framework, 161 would have worked better for
Russia.
By 1997, however, when Federal Reserve chair Alan
Greenspan described "the rule of law ....
property, . .. contract,...
and judicial review and determination" as "the essential
infrastructure of a market economy,"' 6 2 it was too late for Russia.
The average per capita income had declined dramatically below that
63
of the Soviet era.'
To inculcate the values of fiduciary obligation into business
managers requires not only that corporate governance laws exist but
that education and social culture support the right of property. When
American settlers traveled the Overland Trail westward and were
often beyond the law's enforcement by any jurisdiction, the respect for
the property right was still such that "the concept of private property
remained largely inviolable, even when conditions were trying and
people desperate."'1 64
In circumstances of dire need, travelers
continued to contract for others' resources, rather than stealing
them, 6 5 and there were virtually no recorded instances of forceful

160.
STIGLITZ, supra note 34, at 157 (stating that "[tihe IMF told Russia to
privatize as fast as possible; how privatization was done was viewed as secondary").
161.
For the shape and general development of the Chinese legal system, see
Peter Howard Corne, Creationand Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
369 (2002). For the legal reforms in China that "lay the legal foundations of a marketeconomy," see Minxin Pei, Is China Democratizing?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1998,
available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. Note the 387% increase in
commercial litigation cases between 1986 to 1996 and the growth of "a relatively strong
sense of rights, especially property rights." Id. In a 1993 poll of over 5000 respondents
in China, 78% agreed with the statement: "Private property is sacred and must not be
violated." Id. A slightly different view of property in China, but one which emphasizes
the importance of bottom-up legal and economic development is Harry Williams,
Property Rights and Legal Reform in Township and Village Enterprises in China, 2
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL' J. 227 (2001).

162.
Text of Greenspan Speech to Woodrow Wilson Center Award Dinner,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 6, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File Group [hereinafter
Greenspan Speech].
163.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy suffered a precipitous
decline. See DE SOTO, supra note 35. A slower, bottom-up approach, beginning with a
secure property in small land ownership and basic entrepreneurial activities like retail sales
and progressing only over a 10- to 15-year period toward privatization of large statecontrolled manufacturing and mining might have allowed time for Russians to adapt to a
regime of property under the rule of law.
164.

JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL

BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL 359 (1997).
165.
Of the importance of contract in conveying propertied resources, see, e.g.,
id. at 84, 116. As to the relative absence of theft, see id. at 338 ("Rarely do we
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taking of what one had that another wanted or needed. 66 In the new
century, however, when some do not recognize the rule of law and
legal systems as foundational to the study of business, 167 the
problems of corporate governance in the United States are on the rise.
Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, ImClone, Qwest, and
Global Crossing all represent corruption and fraud in business
managers' acquiring or impairing the resources of their companies'
investor-owners--corporate governance failures that reflect not only
weak laws guaranteeing the equal rights of others but also the
absence of the values that respected the right to exclude on the
Overland Trail. Adequate corporate governance requires both laws
that secure the property right of business owners against their
managerial agents and the social commitment to the values of
property that is ideally supported by an educated understanding of
1 68
the property system.
The intent of this Article is not to articulate the rules necessary
for adequate corporate governance, which, in any event, may vary
from culture to culture, but is instead to place corporate governance
conceptually within the property right of exclusion, which is
necessary to attain the maximum potential for resource development.
As the next Section contends, the broader sense of corporate
governance as regulating the relationship between economic actors,
especially the more substantial ones, and society also is contained
within the appreciation of a property system.
B. The Broad Sense of CorporateGovernance and Property
A whole host of groups comprise the anti-globalization movement
that demonstrates at the meetings of the World Trade Organization.
Environmental groups, labor unions, and various groups concerned
about the environment and the health, safety, and wages of workers
in less-developed nations make up the bulk of demonstrators, 16 9 and
their concerns can be met through adequate implementation of a

encounter emigrants [on the overland trail] saying that because the property of others
had been lost, destroyed, or exhausted, their own property might be stolen.").
Furthermore, "people on the overland trail expected that their lost or strayed property
would be returned." Id. at 259.
166.
Only one account "has been discovered of emigrants threatening to kill for
property." Id. at 346. Professor Reid identified just four reports of threats being made
to obtain an owner's resources. Id. at 346. In fact, "[i]f a group of men were starving
they might have no recourse except to kill a horse, but the owner, not the majority,
made the decision. No custom of the trail or general expectation nullified the
exclusiveness of personal rights." Id. at 352-53.
167.
See Reed, supra note 4, at nn.11-12 and accompanying text.
168.
Id.
169.
Robert J. S. Ross and Anita Chan, From North-South to South-South,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 8 (identifying groups concerned with environmental
and labor issues as picketing the World Trade Organization).
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single concept: property. Further, because the issues that concern
the anti-globalization movement are generally those that involve the
potentially adverse affects that large businesses may have on the
resources of those who live in lesser-developed countries, the broad
The following two
sense of corporate governance is implicated.
sections reduce these corporate governance issues to a debate over
property and who should be able to exclude whom from what. The
discussion will not resolve the debate but will rather focus it.
1. The Right to Pollute as an Object of Property
Environmentalists (and some labor unionists) fear that
businesses are leaving the United States and other Western states
that have relatively comprehensive environmental protection laws
and are moving to less-developed countries that have little or no
environmental protection. 170 What they do not usually grasp is that
the issues raised in such moves are better framed not by appeals to
vanishing rainforests and atmospheric warming, but by assertions of
corporate governance failure and the need for strong property
systems. When companies flee environmental protection laws and
seek out countries with inadequate environmental regulation, they
threaten resources like the air and water that are common to all, and
thus they violate the equal right of all to use these resources. This
right can be conceptually reduced to a property right, and the
implementation of an equal right to exclude is central to a strong
property system.
Admittedly, even in the West, it is not usual to think of private
persons as owning the air and water, but broadly speaking, they do

170.
The fear is grounded both in concern about the environment and workers in
developing countries and in concern about maintaining jobs in the developed nations.
See, e.g., Rowan Callick, Sweatshops as Steps in Right Direction, Aus. FIN. REV., Aug.
3, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. Companies that seek out and locate
in the country that controls their various activities the least are said to engage in
"regulatory arbitrage." Douglas M. Branson, Fundamental Themes in Business Law
Education, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 678
(2000). Professor Branson explains,
A multinational may locate activities in nation-states in which regulation poses
For example, the
little or no obstacle to the corporation's activities.
multinational may locate a polluting facility in a former Soviet republic in
which environmental law enforcement is not only lax but nonexistent. The
same multinational might locate a "knockoff" manufacturing facility in a nation
with a large market for the product and little or no protection for intellectual
property, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC). With labor intensive
manufacturing the muti-nationals may seek out a developing nation eager for
employment at any cost and locate a facility there.
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insomuch as they can legally exclude others from certain
interferences with these resources, such as polluting them, and they
have a right to enjoin or seek remedy against those who injure these
resources. Just as tenants in common can sue other co-owners who
lay waste to the common resource, 171 so also when private persons
are able to exclude others from injuring a right that each has to
unpolluted air and water, an exercise of property takes place. That
what constitutes an infringement on one's ownership of air and water
has to be defined by law, and, because courts will usually lack the
expertise to set such environmental standards, they will need setting
by public legislative or administrative action. Courts can and already
do interpret and apply such standards when disputes arise.
In the United States, any citizen whose interest in unpolluted air
and water is directly affected can sue to enforce Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act pollution standards. 172
Standing to sue is
recognition of property in the sense asserted here because it triggers
the right to exclude others from interfering with one's resource. That
many of the other traditional incidents of ownership are not
associated with the property indicated by the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act may doctrinally concern common-law legal scholars,
but the right of exclusion is the sine qua non of property, and
environmental laws do allow for citizens to exclude companies or
others from injuring the air and water, as measured by the rules set
by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Environmentalists
demonstrating at the World Bank meeting, and nationbuilders in
developing countries, should realize that both the maintenance of
clean air and water as well as of long-term sustainable prosperity
involving their use can be conceptualized through the framework of
173
an exclusionary property system.

171.
E.g., A. JAMES CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 20.23 (1952) (stating
that holders of concurrent property interests, which include tenants in common, are
liable to their co-tenants for waste).
172.
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2002) (stating that "any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf ... against any person . . . who is alleged to
be in violation of . . . an affluent standard or limitation under this Act ....
). The
similar Clean Air Act Section is 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2002).
173.
What is being suggested here is that everyone has a property interest in
environmental resources to an extent defined by law and thus is able to bring action to
exclude others from interfering with these resources in ways that directly, materially,
and adversely affect human health.
Compare this suggestion to stakeholder
approaches to corporate governance discussed in Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate
Governance in ComparativePerspective: Prospects for Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. &
POLLY J. 5 (2000). The advantage to protecting the environment or other "stakeholder"
interests through property is that this approach focuses the resolution of resource
issues through the single legal concept that is the hub of Western legal systems. There
becomes no need to balance environmental stakeholder interests against corporate
property interests. Both interests are property interests, and the issue for resolution is
whether the resource use of one owner (the polluter) interferes with the equal resource
right (e.g., breathing clean air) of another owner. A tort law variation of this property
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Consider what might happen if the right to pollute the world's
air and water resources were truly brought within the property
For instance, if everyone on earth legally owned
system.
proportionate shares to pollute the world's air and water, 174 these
shares could be sold to those who need to pollute according to safe
standards for total pollution amount set by international treaty. If 60
billion pounds of a certain atmospheric pollutant is the level
considered safe to emit on an annual basis, then each person in the
world could have a property in 10 pounds of this pollutant. To reduce
transaction costs, individuals might not have to trade their individual
shares; rather, the appropriate international agency could auction off
these rights to polluters periodically, and the proceeds could be
distributed to the countries of the world on a populationproportionate basis. One approach could be to agree by international
treaty to specify the use of such funds for national investment
purposes like education, health, disaster relief, and infrastructure.
Eventually and ideally, each individual might personally receive her
share from the pollution auction or get a tax credit. The point is not
that such a property creation is likely in the current economic and
political climate, but that environmental corporate governance
concerns can be reduced for debate to issues of property, which, as
has been previously asserted, is the central hub of Western legal
systems 175 and the catalyst for maximum resources generation.

approach simply acknowledges the property interest of people in themselves and
recognizes polluter-caused environmental health threats as violating that right and
causing injury, thus entitling those injured to compensation and/or injunction.
Although this property assignment is unlikely in the near future, it is not
174.
administratively far-fetched, and already a less comprehensive variation of itemissions trading-is taking place. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 recognized
such trading in sulfur dioxide. 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (1994). For discussion of emissions
trading, see GARY C. BRYNER, NEW TOOLS FOR IMPROVING GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
AN ASSESSMENT OF EMISSIONS TRADING AND OTHER MARKET-BASED REGULATORY
TOOLS (1999); EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH (Richard

F. Kosobad ed., 2000). In October 2002, the European Parliament approved a
greenhouse gas emissions trading policy to achieve reductions required under the
Kyoto Protocol. European Lawmakers Advance Greenhouse Gas Trading System,
OCTANE WK., Oct. 14, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
175.
Supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. See also Reed, supra note 4, at
nn.42-56 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, not all of the environmental problems
of the developing world derive from lack of adequate corporate governance. For
example, the absence of basic sanitation is a major environmental problem with over
90% of the sewage generated being discharged with no treatment, such sanitation
problems are estimated to account for 80% of all illnesses in the developing world.
William L. Andreen, Environmental Law and InternationalAssistance: The Challenge
of Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
17, 18 (2000).
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2. Worker Health, Safety, and Non-Discrimination as Objects of
Property
The most basic resource that people have is the one that they
have in themselves-their potential for effort and ingenuity,
supported by their physical integrity, a resource historically protected
by the right to exclude others. 176 When workers have their health
impaired because of poor working conditions or their personal safety
abridged by employment-related injury, the property in their most
essential resource is infringed. In property-strong countries, health
and safety statutes and systems of tort and worker's compensation
help secure the resources that workers own in themselves, but in
property-weak nations unhealthful and dangerous working conditions
can imperil both the personal and economic futures of their
populations.
Thus, broad corporate governance laws that limit
uninhibited business activity around the globe seem appropriate on
both health and safety grounds and are fully consonant with the
regime of property.
Companies may respond that even as a property system allows
them to take risks with their resources, it also holds them to losses
when poor choices are made and that the same risks and losses are
inherent in employment. As long as employers and employees risk
their resources voluntarily, the state should not skew the voluntary
exchange of resources, which produces the greatest social prosperity.
Although efficiency is indeed defined by the voluntary exchange of
resources in a strong property system, market imperfections, such as
transaction costs that defeat compensation when an employer has
caused injury to an employee and asymmetries of information
between contracting parties in the employment context, 177 make
market fundamentalism a less compelling social option than adequate
corporate governance in all countries of the world. In poor, propertyweak countries, the absence of an adequate tort system or safety and
health statutes and the lack of established contract law with

176.
Of course, the common law divides the right of exclusion into the rights to
exclude others from injuring one's person (including one's health) and from injuring
one's "property" (external or non-facultative resources).
See generally 1 & 2
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 60. Nationbuilders striving to understand
what about Western legal systems catalyzed great production of resources need not
imitate the convoluted forms of action following historically from this division. Like
Madison, supra note 3, they may conceptualize the right of exclusion both to one's
person (originally possessed facultative resources) and one's external, non-facultative
resources acquired without coercion, theft, or fraud as "property." In this context, a
worker's health is a resource that is within the exclusive private sphere of what is
"proper" to a person, i.e., what one has "property" in.
177.
It cannot be overemphasized that the advocacy of property as a national
wealth-maximizing institution is not an apology for international laissez-faire
corporate bucaneerism, environmental degradation, nor worker abuse. Not market
fundamentalism, but the rule of law, is basic to a strong property system.
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doctrines of duress, incapacity, undue influence, mistake, and
unconscionability weaken the merits of the voluntary-exchange
argument when balanced against the need to strengthen the equal
property right of others through broad corporate governance.
Whether domestically or internationally instituted, corporate
governance to prohibit invidious discrimination against qualified
workers due to race, gender, age, and other inherent characteristics
can also be couched in property-related terms. The main issue
concerns where the state assigns the right of property. 178 Does it
recognize the property of the employer to exclude others from
interfering with the employer's free use of resources in the choice to
hire and fire on any basis, including various discriminations based on
inherent racial or other characteristics? Or does it acknowledge the
property right of the employee and job applicant to exclude the
employer from discriminating based on such characteristics,
effectively recognizing certain non-discrimination as an individual
resource? In analyzing these questions in the context of property,
recall that property is a right of exclusion, not tangible or intangible
things, and that the state should assign, or not assign, the
exclusionary right to a resource according to whether it wishes to
produce more or less of the resource. Recognizing an exclusionary
right of discrimination in the employer gives incentive to discriminate
and, in all reasonable likelihood, will lead to greater discrimination
from employers who desire to discriminate than when the jobapplicant or employee can legally exclude the employer from
discriminating, in which case more non-discrimination will probably
179
be generated.
Although it is not usual to think of the actions of discrimination
and non-discrimination as objects of the property right, neither was it
common at one time to consider the copying of literary and musical

178.
This statement acknowledges that for property to exist the state must
specify which resources property protects, especially as to intangible resources. The
property in trade secrets, invention, and pollution emission exist only as the state
recognizes these things as resources it wishes to encourage through the incentive of
exclusionary right. In the West, the assignment of property to protect various new
resources is puzzling or controversial only because most resources, especially tangible
resources, have been so long protected by property that we forget that the law must
initially recognize who gets what, and thus the current assignments seem "natural."
See Andrew Beckerman-Rodav, Are Ideas Within The Traditional Definition Of
Property?:A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603 (1994) ("Any ordered system
of society must confront the issue of who owns and who can exert control over various
tangible and intangible things.").
179.
Like freedom of speech, property is a right, the right to exclude others from
resources limited at any moment of time. Treating race, gender, or age as an originally
possessed resource that one can exclude others from interfering with by employment
discrimination is not illogical if what nationbuilders wish to do is give incentive for
more employment non-discrimination.
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works or the protection of inventions, trade secrets, and business
goodwill as the objects of property.' 8 0
In terms of corporate
governance, however, it is illuminating to reduce the specific
relationship of business managers to business owners and the general
relationship of business enterprises to employees and society to
application of the exclusionary property right. Some managers will
likely always misappropriate the resources of corporate owners, and
globalization and anti-globalization forces may never entirely come to
agreement, but in order to understand the maximum potential for
prosperity, the term that frames the debate should be "property"-the
right to exclude others from limited resources.

V. CONCLUSION

Property is not found in the informal tenets of Western culture,
nor does it derive from the genes of our hunter-gatherer ancestors,
although it may be an expression of both. Rather, it is a formal,
constitutive principle of political, legal, and economic life that seems
to accommodate the resource-oriented behaviors of states of strangers
in a way that encourages people to become more prosperous and to
feel freer than either the state-planning system of socialist coercion or
the market fundamentalism of economic laissez-faire theory. At its
heart, property is the legally-instituted right to exclude others,
including the state, from resources that are originally owned or are
acquired without force, fraud, or theft.
Because property is a way of ordering resources in a community,
the individual's exclusionary right in a strong system is always
limited by the equal exclusionary right of others. This limitation is
the same one that limits liberty, for property and liberty are merely
two sides of the same coin; it is a limitation that emphasizes that an
adequate property system in its very meaning does not allow the few
to use their resources to abuse the many.
And, although
property/liberty may answer the question of how to produce a
prosperous, free community, it does not address how society should
morally respond to the individually poor, infirm, and unfortunate
among us. An appreciation, however, of the natural incentives to
production that the institution of property maximally encourages
does tell us that if the state excessively coerces resources from those
who have to meet the needs or wants of others who lack (or the state
cannot effectively prevent private persons from coercing the resources
of others), both prosperity and freedom are weakened.
As a formal legal institution rather than a moral imperative,
property does not specify the scope of resources to which it should (or

180.

See Vandevelde, supra note 5.

20031

NA TIONBUIL DING 101

721

should not) apply. The right to exclude is merely a neutral principle
that powers resource increase by protecting the expression of natural
tendencies of resource creation, acquisition, and display connected to
mating and child care, connected so that to deprive persons of the
increase from the exercise of these tendencies can significantly
depress incentive to resourceful activity in ways that neither
education nor coercion can effectively overcome in a society. All
societies apply private exclusion to at least some resources, but the
issues of which resources property should protect and how deeply to
tax private resources to provide a common infrastructure and to
assist those in exigent need without killing the goose that lays the
golden wealth of nations, still remains unresolved. That the legal
institution of a strong, well-enforced property system, however,
supports both freedom in the facultative resources of the person and
national abundance from the marketplace exchanges of nonfacultative resources seems significantly settled. For nationbuilders
concerned with a prosperity and liberty that nurture the hope for
sustainable peace, this reductionism is the beginning.
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